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Mayumi Hayashi: A video-interview concerning the Fureai Kippu

(International Journal of Community Currency Research https://ijccr.net/)

ABSTRACT

Japan’s Fureai Kippu (‘Ticket for a Caring Relationship’) refers to mutual support networks of members of all ages, targeted at providing care for older people through exchanges of time credits, sometimes supplemented by cash payments (‘time-­‐banking’).

This has attracted increasing attention as a potential contribution to the ‘Big Society’ with an ageing population.

However, despite its pioneering role and scale, relatively little is known about the details and outcomes of Fureai Kippu, and meanwhile simplistic and optimistic generalizations predominate.

This article, using historical analysis and empirical evidence, seeks to address these gaps by examining the origins of Fureai Kippu, its early expansion, post- 2000 slowdown and responses.

It considers the practical contributions and varied benefits potentially offered by the system, along with its operational difficulties. The conclusion is that Fureai Kippu is so complex that not only is evaluation difficult but also no universal panacea can be expected from it.

Read the whole article: https://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf

mirror / backup: Mayumi Hayashi Kings College London – JAPANS FUREAI KIPPU TIMEBANKING IN ELDERLY CARE ORIGINS DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND IMPACT ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf

Fureai Kippu

Fureai Kippu

Introduction

The Fureai Kippu (literally ‘ticket for a caring relationship’) refers to a variety of Japanese national schemes and networks of mutual support dedicated to providing elderly care through the exchange of a complementary currency 1. The schemes enable individuals to earn time-credits by providing care to elderly people or people with disabilities. Those credits can then be transferred to relatives or friends in need of care, or be saved for the future when sick or old.

Of the two most prominent models of Fureai Kippu, one stands close to traditional timebanking, whereas the other enables conventional money transactions alongside time credits in exchange for the service provided. In the latter, volunteers can decide whether to receive a combination of national currency (yen) and time credits or either one as compensation for providing services 2.

The Fureai Kippu schemes can be considered as the Japanese versions of co-production through timebanking. The term Fureai Kippu has been in use since 1992 3.

Purpose

The Fureai Kippu aims at developing and strengthening mutually supportive networks of informal elderly care in a country increasingly facing challenges related to a rapidly ageing population, decline in the capacity of family to care for the elder members and sky-rocketing healthcare costs 4.

Community Overview

Japan is a nation of approximately 128 million people 5. The country has the longest overall life expectancy at birth of any other nation on earth (UN, 2006). It is estimated that people born in the period 2010-2015 will live 83,5 years 6. After the post WW2 baby boom, Japanese population is rapidly aging, following a sharp decline in birth rates. In 2009 roughly 22,7% of the population was over 65 and following the trends, in 2050 almost 40% of Japanese will be 65+ 7.

Organisation and History

The Sawayaka Welfare foundation is a non-profit organization launched in 1991 that acts as the umbrella body of the local Fureai Kippu schemes in Japan. Similarly to Time Banks UK, it promotes best practices and assists local initiatives grow 8. Tsutomu Hotta, who also coined the term Fureai Kippu, launched the organization.

Japan has a long tradition of voluntary help and reciprocal assistance dating back to the post WW2 period. The world’s first time bank, named Volunteer Labor Bank, was founded in Osaka, Japan in 1973 9. This was a voluntary network of people providing assistance to each other through the exchange of a time-based complementary currency, named ‘Love Currency’. 10 This example was not part of the Fureai Kippu system, but paved the way for its widespread application in Japan.

The Fureai Kippu emerged in the 1980s, a period in which to overcome the limitations of family-based care, hundreds of grassroots groups of mutual help emerged across the country. The predominant model of Fureai Kippu evolved within these groups, after introducing a rather different reimbursement arrangement compared to conventional timebanking schemes already existing in Japan at the time. Under Fureai Kippu, volunteer members could decide to combine monetary remuneration with time credits: they could choose between earning conventional money (yen), time credits or both in exchange for the service provided. 11

According to data of 2012, 38% of Fureai Kippu are run by small grassroots groups; 21% by local government or quasi-government bodies; the remaining 41% are run by two non-profit organizations. 12

Impact

Research on Fureai Kippu suggested that overall the schemes have had a positive role in improving both physical and psychological health of volunteers and recipients of services; helped improve the condition and social relations of vulnerable people; and finally helped to establish more equal relationships between volunteer members and recipients due to the exchange of money (where applicable). 13

Overall, the Fureai Kippu has settled as an effective supplement to conventional professionalized health care resources in Japan. It is perceived to be less top-down and a more humane than the national healthcare service. 14

Currency Details

a. The system in numbers

A research of 2012 suggested there were 391 Fureai Kippu branches in Japan 15. Currently, no data is available on the number of volunteers involved neither on the number of recipients.

b. Function and Unit of Account

The function of time-credits under the Fureai Kippu schemes is to act as a medium of exchange. As the name suggests, the unit of account is time (hours).

c. Issuance

Issuance mechanism vary across the different instances. Typically, notes and tickets are used as the medium of exchange, with very few electronic systems as yet.

d. Software

The Japan’s biggest Fureai Kippu organization, Nippon Life Active Club, introduced customized software to record transactions of time credits in its 130-odd branches across Japan, thereby enabling it to produce its collective data as well as compare and analyse data between branches. However, issuing and redeeming time credits among members are done manually, based on paper-based record keeping.

e. Taxation and Compliance

In general, neither time credits nor cash payments (yen) in Fureai Kippu schemes are considered taxable [Ref needed], the latter (cash) usually being regarded as “donations”, thus exempted from taxation.

f. Funding – Business Model

The majority of Fureai Kippu schemes are run by non-for-profit organizations and communities of mutual-help, all of which are independent from government. Thus they receive few grants and instead self-fund through the membership fee and private donations, supplemented by user-fees for service recipients who do not have time credits to redeem.

How does it work in practice?

A Fureai Kippu branch in Los Angeles has some 100 Japanese immigrant members. One member, Tanaka-san, takes her neighboring older member food shopping by car once a week for about two hours and earns 8 to 10 time credits every month, based on a one-hour-one-credit formula. Tanaka-san then presents her accumulated credits to her frail older mother living in Tokyo where her mother uses the credits to buy weekly home help from her neighboring volunteer member in a Tokyo branch. Since her mother is living alone and has mobility problems, she looks forward very much to these visits, expressing that ‘She is like my daughter whom I can see only once a year when she comes back from Los Angeles’. Tanaka-san is also very happy to see her mother happy and be able to help her in an indirect, small but significant way. She also stresses the importance of an informal and humane relationship between her mother and the volunteer member through time credits, which are hard to get in commercial services provided by professional care workers.

Further readings and videos:

Nakagawa and Bovaird (2011), Hureai Kippu – lessons from Japan for the ‘Big Society’. Available at http://www.jlgc.org.uk/en/pdfs/Hureai%20Kippu%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Japan%20for%20the%20Big%20SocietyCESedit17March2011.pdf

mirror / backup: Hureai Kippu – Lessons from Japan for the Big SocietyCESedit17March2011.pdf

Nippon Life Active Club (NALC) (http://nalc.jp).

References

  1. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 30-44. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  2. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 35
  3. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 36
  4. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 30-44. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  5. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2012. Available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/site-ad/index_english/esuikei/gh2401e.asp
  6. United Nations World Population Prospects, 2006 revision. UN. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf
  7. (Japan Statistics Bureau, 2010
  8. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A). Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  9. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 33. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  10. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 33. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  11. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 35. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  12. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 33. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  13. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 37. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  14. Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 37. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf
  15. (SWF, 2012; Hayashi, M. (2012) ‘Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-banking in Elderly Care: Origins, Development, Challenges and Impact’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (A) 37. Available at http://ijccr.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/ijccr-2012-hayashi.pdf

Related:

http://community-currency.info/en/

http://www.innovationunit.org/blog/201404/inspiring-healthcare-fureai-kippu

 

 

is India just Stiglitz’s playground?

https://altcoopsys.org/2017/01/31/world-economic-forum-in-davos-joseph-stiglitz-and-kenneth-rogoff-want-cashless-fully-digital-society/

Goldman Sachs hails Modi note ban as rupee swings drop most in 6 weeks

Currency reform will increase banking-system liquidity, and the rupee and local notes will likely outperform Asian peers in the near term, Goldman Sachs analysts said

http://www.livemint.com/Money/sAWTdsYQ1uc7bFbQCWG1JN/Goldman-Sachs-hails-Modi-note-ban-as-rupee-swings-drop-most.html

82% of all money in circulation is NOT paper. Because it originated between banks giving each other loans. This is called book-money.

50% of all Indians DO NOT HAVE A BANK ACCOUNT. So this is massive push to digitize India’s monetary system. But for what purpose? Stricter surveillance?

“To fully understand the following, it is important to be aware of the Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA), formed in 2012 to push back the use of cash globally. Founding members are US-institutions who stand to gain most. Those are notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Microsoft), Visa, Mastercard, Citigroup and Omidyar Network (eBay). Funding members are also the notorious Ford Foundation and the US government’s development agency USAID. Do keep in mind the acronym BTCA, as it will show up a lot in brackets to flag its members, as their role in Indian demonetisation is described.

  1. In 2013, the year after BTCA was founded, Raghuram Rajan, former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, took over the post of Governor of the Reserve Bank of Inida (RBI), coming directly from the University of Chicago.
    1. One of his first decisions was to set up the “Committee on Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low Income Households”.
    2. He put Nachiket Mor in charge of it, a banker an board-member of the RBI.
    3. In March 2016 the Gates Foundation (BTCA) made Mor head of its India country office. A reward?
  2. Somewhat counterintuitively, the Mor Commission that was to foster financial inclusion of the poor and of rural areas, was heavily dominated by big finance and law firms, with a strong US-bias.
    1. Members included former Citigroup-CEO (BTCA) Vikram Pandit and Bundu Ananth, President of IFMR Trust.
    2. IFMR is an Indian Research Institute, which has many US-Institutions as funders, including Chicago University, USAID (BTCA), Gates Foundation (BFCA), Ford foundation (BTCA), Citi (BTCA).
    3. IFMR is a member of the “Alliance for financial inclusion”, which is financed by the Gates-Foundation (BTCA).
    4. A further member of the Mor Committee was a representative of the National Payments Corporation of India the umbrella organization of payment service providers, which aims to move India to a cashless society.
    5. Another member was credit Rating Agency CRISIL, majority-owned by the US Rating-giant Standard & Poor’s.
  3. In 2015, USAID (BCA) announced a formal partnership with the Indian finance ministry to advance digital payments in India.
    1. The Better Than Cash Foundation is an associated partner to this partnership, as are most of the key BTCA-members individually.
    2. USAID commissioned a report on the payment infrastructure in India and on ways to advance digital payments.
    3. In January 2016 USAID presented the report titled “Beyond Cash”.
  4. In May 2016, RBI announced plans to print a new series of banknotes and announced in August that it had approved a design for a new 2,000 rupee note.
  5. In September 2016, McKinsey Global Institute issued a report titled “How digital finance could boost growth in emerging economies”.
    1. Authors acknowledged “collaboration with the Financial Services for the Poor team at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
    2. They thanked more than ten Gates-Foundation (BTCA) people for contribution to the report, including Gates-Foundation’s India head Nachiket Mor of Rajan’s Mor-Committee.
    3. In mid-December, seemingly unfazed by ample evidence that taking away cash in India has been the exact opposite of helping the poor and promoting “financial inclusion”, McKinsey-partner Susan Lund and study contributor Laura Tyson published “The promise of digital finance”, making fantastic claims about the advantages of pushing back cash-use in favor of digital, including ten percent higher GDP for countries like India.
    4. They disseminated this piece on the website of Project Syndicate, which is payed for by US hedge fund billionaire George Soros.
    5. It also went to dozens of newspapers worldwide via Project Syndicat.
    6. Co-author Tyson also has relations to Soros via the World Economic Forum.
  6. Also in September 2016, less than four weeks before the surprise demonetization, the partnership between USAID and the finance ministry to advance digital payments was ”taken to a new level” by the creation of the “Catalyst”, with the webadress cashlesscatalyst.org”.
    1. US-Ambassador Jonathan Addleton said at the occasion that “India is at the forefront of global efforts to digitize economies”.
    2. The CEO of Catalyst announced that the goal was a field experiment to increase digital payments tenfold in one city.
    3. USAID declared, it would finance this initiative for three years.
  7. Catalyst is housed at IFMR, the institute mentioned above, of which Gates Foundation India’s-CEO Mor is a board member, and which relies very much on funding from various members of the Better Than Cash Alliance.

So, is this all done, to help some stupid business-men get richer, at the expense of the poor? I guess so. As usual.

When cash goes down – paypal goes up. That’s what they think. At least.

Who knew?

To conclude that the finance ministry and the prime minister decided on the demonetization assault with no significant involvement of US-institutions, we would need to believe, that USAID, Catalyst and the people at IFMR – mislead by the finance ministry of India – were working on and paying for a trial project to scale-up digital payment in only one city, right up until Modi surprisingly announced the temporary abolishment of most cash in the whole of India. Since a trial in one city alone could only have worked by creating strong  incentives to use digital payments and probably investing in the infrastructure, what Modi announced on November 8 would have made obsolete all single-city plans and preparations of Catalyst, if they had ever existed. We would have to believe that the people at the ministry who knew, and Modi, did not see a need or find a reason to delay that project until it became clear it was no longer needed.If the US government should have been displeased with their agency being ostensibly fooled into planning and paying for a useless project without being informed, they did not show it. A spokesperson of the State Department said, that the move, despite some “inconvenience” for many Indians and visiting Americans was “important and necessary to crack down on illegal actions.”

Whose initiative was It?

Granted, the creation of Catalyst might just have been a clever ruse to be able to prepare the surprise demonetisation without arousing suspicion, because a one-city field-experiment was publicly announced. However, this would make it even more relevant, that Catalyst was a heavily US-influenced operation, paid for by USAID and having grown out of a longer-standing cooperation between USAID, the Washington-based Better Than Cash Alliance and the Indian ministry of finance. 

To assume that the US-government was not informed of the plans stretches belief, given the circumstances. Assuming they have been informed and involved, one could still think, that Modi took the initiative to demonetise India, either in good faith or for more sinister reasons, and simply enlisted help and advice of US institutions. If so, the “help” did not consist in effectively helping to meet the challenge of providing all of India with new mney in a timely fashion. That part went terribly wrong. The only advice that the Better Than Cash Alliance has ever had, is to reign in the use of cash and to advertise the use of digital payment systems. Note that for those who want to push back the use of cash worldwide, the disaster that demonetization was for the majority of Indians, was a benefit, rather than a problem. Worldwide it instilled fear that people and businesses relying solely on cash could experience the same. If Modi and the Indian government should have acted with the supposed interest of the country in mind, and thought that they would get useful, unbiased advice from foreign institutions with a strong and obvious business interest in the abolishment of cash and from a foreign government whose country is home to the companies that dominate digital payment systems globally, then he would have been naïve at the border of imbecile. I will not assume that. The fact that the ground in India was prepared from at least 2013, by a committee of the RBI with very heavy US-links, and then by a formal USAID-finance-ministry partnership, does not lend more plausibility to the narrative, that the initiative was Modi’s.

We will look more closely at the economic arguments and the evidence in favor of financial inclusion and of pushing back cash in a follow-up article.

Did ‘Better than Cash’ coopt vested Indian interests

The hypothesis that the main driver or a main driver behind the demonetization were US interests, does not at all imply that the Indian prime minister and other Indian constituents did not have their own interests associated with it. It is hardly possible to get the elite of a country to do something that goes against their own interests, but it is fairly easy to get them to do something that helps (significant fractions of) them, but hurts the majority of the people. A few possible such interests, some of them quite plausible, I would like to quote from a readers letter:

1) recapitalising the public banks, which were staggering under the weight of bad loans to cronies. Soon after the demonetisation, the state banks waived loans to 63 corporations, including Modi’s close friend and ally, Adani. the entire corporate sector is expected to benefit from lowered interest rates as a result of recapitalization.
 2) there are major local beneficiaries of pushing people onto the cashless system, such as Nilekani and Ambani, who probably played a part in persuading Modi. Nilekani is the key person behind the Aadhar system of equipping every Indian with an ID card, through which they are now required to get food rations, train tickets and other basic services. this system greatly increases the possibilities for controlling the population and crushing dissenters. Ambani is the owner of an online payment platform that has directly benefited from demonetisation.
 3) destroying the informal, cash-based economy of the poor and pushing through retail chains instead. curiously, the big retail chains were well supplied with cash in their in-store ATMs. they experienced a boom immediately after demonetisation.
 5) destroying the informal economy would also ease the process of land acquisition, as indebted farmers would be forced to sell. land acquisition for real estate and other development, a long-standing demand of global capital, has been stalled by grassroots movements.
 6) emptying out the cash coffers of rival political parties. Elections are due in February in several major states. the political process in India has been profoundly corrupted by the loosened financial controls since neoliberal reforms in the 1990s.
 7) another idea that has been put forward is megalomania—Modi wanted to do something dramatic and drastic to push through multiple benefits to his backers, and also pose as a crusader against corruption. incidentally, some recently leaked documents indicate that Modi himself received bribes from a corporate house. even India’s supreme court is too chicken to order an investigation, at least thus far.

src: https://rwer.wordpress.com/2017/01/09/more-evidence-of-early-us-involvement-in-indian-demonetisation/

War by Other Means
A CFR Book
Robert D Blackwill Jennifer M Harris War by other Means Geoeconomics and statecraft book cover
Robert D Blackwill Jennifer M Harris War by other Means Geoeconomics and statecraft book cover

 

“Despite having the most powerful economy on earth, the United States too often reaches for the gun instead of the purse,” contend CFR Senior Fellows Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris in War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. They argue that the United States should strategically integrate economic and financial instruments into its foreign policy—what they define as geoeconomics—or risk losing ground as a world power. Read more and order a copy »