Ransomware – Erpessungs-Verschlüsselungs-Viren – ein lukratives Geschäft im Multi-Millionen-USD-EURO-Bereich.

England: Kryptotrojaner legt zahlreiche Krankenhäuser lahm

Dieses Geld wird natürlich von den Hackern reinvestiert – in selbiges Geschäft – um noch mehr Profit zu machen.

Dabei reicht das besuchen einer (gehackten?) Website auf der JavaScript-Viren hinterlegt sind.

Schon werden sämtliche Urlaubsbilder vom Virus verschlüsselt und die digitale Hand aufgehalten… oder der Schlüssel wird nach X Tagen gelöscht.

Unternehmen werden sich warm anziehen müssen.

Ich habe gehört Bank-Automaten sind langsam von Windows XP jetzt auf 7 geupdated und das Bargeld soll abgeschafft werden – scheinbar in Schweden schon erfolgt. (wenigstens durften die ihre lokale Währung die Krone behalten)

Digitalisierung – Reihenweise werden Bank-Filialen zusammen gelegt oder geschlossen

Das trifft tausende Mitarbeiter.

“Digitalisierung: Bankenkönnen Mehrwert verdoppeln Bis zu 60 Prozent aller Bankprozesse lassen sich digitalisieren. Aktuell liegt dieser Wert bei vielen deutschen Geldinstituten jedoch nur bei rund 30 Prozent oder darunter.” – 4.000 Stellen – 5000 Stellen

Der immense Stellenwegfall ist wohl auf einen hohen Ertragsschwund zurückzuführen. Besonders die Mittelstandsbank bereitet der Chefetage sorgen. Wie das Wall Street Journal berichtet, versucht der Vorstand daher die Verluste durch den Abbau Tausender Stellen in den Griff zu bekommen. 5.000 Stellen würden mehr als 10% der Mitarbeiter des zweitgrößten deutschen Bankinstitutes darstellen.

This term came to public with Margeret Thatcher: TINAThere Is (said to be) No Alternative

It’s basically just bullshitting the public by politicians – that either do not know what they do – or just don’t care.

At the same time admitting – that democracy – the law and order state is dead or at least bankrupt – and all state debt is hold by a privately controlled bank – now defacto making the laws.

Margeret Thatcher: Democracy is dead - Even hell is now being privatized.
Margeret Thatcher: Democracy is dead – Even hell is now being privatized.

Well if there is no alternative – what is the use of democratic decision making system? zero.

Who says there are no alternatives? The elites. Because they want THEIR AGENDA. Because as always in life – there are ALWAYS alternatives.

Some good some bad. Some even better than what your politicians want to sign to law.

Angela Merkel - "Without Alternative! Exactly!"
“Without Alternative! Exactly!”

“… it wasn’t me… ” no of course not. Goldman Sachs advisors manipulated the Greek finance balance shed to make it look good – so they could enter the Euro-Finance-Zone and get cheap credit. More than they can afford.

Angela Merkel: 2008 - private (!) Banks are blackmailing the state - they ask for money - to be rescued.
Angela Merkel: After 2008 real estate speculation bubble bursts (“suprime crisis”) – private (!) Banks are blackmailing the German state – ask for money – to be rescued – or tear down the financial system. This costs the German taxpayer 747 Billion €. Merkel actually said – “i am actually stupid” or “i play stupid and will get a very nice job at Deutsche Bank after my term – so shut up and follow my orders”.



The World Bank and the IMF love nothing more than beyond-all imagination corrupt politicians – that take hughe loans in foreign currency – and basically sell their country to private investors.



What could have been the alternative?

… because there always are alternatives – but leaders won’t tell you. The alternative could have been: Finance Ministers sit together – to make a law – that the ECB/EZB should give the about-to-collapse private banks (e.g. Commerzbank… ) 0% loans… as they do now 2017 ANYWAY. As easy as that. So you see – there is a different agenda going on behind the scenes than the one we are told – and some politicians are stupid enough to actually believe it.


Greenspan drew from his analysis “a radical position: the United States should return to the gold standard of the nineteenth century. By tying money and credit to a fixed supply of gold, the nation could prevent toxic surges in purchasing power.” … “‘The pre-World War I gold standard prevented speculative “flights from reality” — with their disastrous consequences,’ “Greenspan insisted.”

President George W. Bush presents the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, one of 14 recipients of the 2005 Presidential Medal of Freedom, awarded Wednesday, Nov. 9, 2005 in the East Room of the White House. White House photo by Shealah Craighead


Alan Greenspan, Sellout

by David Gordon

Sebastian Mallaby is the Paul A. Volcker Senior Fellow for International Economic Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations. One can be sure, then, that his new comprehensive book, The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan, reflects an Establishment point of view. As if this were not enough to tell us where the book is coming from, Mallaby informs us that he had Greenspan’s full cooperation in writing it. “This book is based on almost unlimited access to Alan Greenspan, his papers, and his colleagues and friends, all of whom were generous in their collaboration.

Though the book is hardly a panegyric to Greenspan, Mallaby views his subject with considerable favor. Nevertheless, the book contains ample material for a more severe verdict: Greenspan abandoned the free market convictions he effectively defended early in his career as an economist. To uphold economic truth was not the path to the power and influence Greenspan sought; and he readily adjusted his beliefs to fit with his ambitions.

Greenspan attached himself to Ayn Rand’s inner band of disciples; but his adherence to free-market economics did not stem from his alliance with Objectivism. Greenspan learned economic theory from Arthur Burns at Columbia University. For Greenspan, like his mentor Burns, statistics had primary importance: economic theory emerged from discerning patterns in the data and was strictly subordinate to its empirical sources. “Burns was the chief heir to Wesley Mitchell’s empiricist tradition, and his influence restrained any enthusiasm that Greenspan might have felt for the new trends that had begun to stir in economics. … Even the cleverest econometric calculation was limited because yesterday’s statistical relationships might break down tomorrow; by contrast, finer measures of what the economy is doing are more than just estimates — they are facts.”

From his studies of the data, Greenspan arrived at an important conclusion. Financial markets played a crucial role in the genesis of the business cycle: “Squarely confronting the notion that financial markets are merely a casino of meaningless side bets, he laid out an insight for which Nobel laureate James Tobin would later capture the credit. Stock prices drive corporate investments in fixed assets. … In turn, these investments drive many of the booms and busts in a capitalist economy.”

Greenspan applied his insight to Fed policy in a way that resembles the Austrian theory of the business cycle. During the 1920s, “the Fed’s key error was to underestimate its own contribution to the stock bubble. The rise in the market had set off a rise in investment and consumer spending, which in turn had boosted profits and stoked animal spirits, triggering a further rise in the stock market. The 1920s Fed had been the enabler of this feedback loop — in order for investment and consumer spending to take off, companies and consumers needed access to credit. Faced with a jump in the appetite to borrow, the Fed had [wrongly] decided ‘to meet the legitimate demands of business,’ as Greenspan put it.”

Greenspan drew from his analysis “a radical position: the United States should return to the gold standard of the nineteenth century. By tying money and credit to a fixed supply of gold, the nation could prevent toxic surges in purchasing power.” … “‘The pre-World War I gold standard prevented speculative “flights from reality” — with their disastrous consequences,’ “Greenspan insisted.”

Nor was this the only area where Greenspan adopted a radically free-market stance. Defying the mainstream, “Greenspan followed up with an attack on government efforts to rein in monopolies with antitrust laws. … He pointed out that it was not just corporate managers who would want to challenge monopolists; the financial system would demand that they do so. If a monopoly extracted fat rents from its customers, its share prices would soar; that would give entrepreneurs an incentive to create rivals to the monopoly, and it would give financiers an incentive to ply those rivals with abundant capital.” Mallaby views this “crude” view with evident distaste, noting that both Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman adopted a more “nuanced” position.

What then became of this free-market radical? Unfortunately, his desire for “power and pelf,” in Murray Rothbard’s phrase, led him to alter his views. A firm commitment to freedom would never gain him entry to the inner sanctum of government, and Greenspan soon learned to temper his views.

In his radical days, Greenspan had opposed government bailouts to failing firms: the discipline of failure was essential to the operation of the free market. In 1971, he defied his teacher Arthur Burns, who favored bailing out Lockheed. “Testifying before the Senate, Greenspan refused to back his mentor. ‘I am in fundamental disagreement with this type of loan guarantee,’ he began. Government-directed lending ‘must inevitably lead to subsidization of the least efficient firms,’ damaging productivity and therefore living standards. … What the economy really needed was for weak companies to go bust, so that capital and workers would move to better-run establishments.”

Once close to the levers of power, matters were different. He wished to become Paul Volcker’s successor as Fed chairman, and he knew that firm opposition to Fed policy would hurt his chances for the job. Going against his earlier analysis, he supported the “largest bank bailout in U.S. history,” the rescue in 1984 of the Continental Illinois National Bank. He admitted the dangers of the bailout, but it was, as Mallaby summarizes his position, “necessary and appalling.” Appalling, one suspects, because of its effects on the free market; but necessary to advance Greenspan’s career. By the time he became Fed Chairman, the transformation was complete. By 1989, his “libertarian rejection of bailouts was long gone; what he wanted above all was the space to fight inflation.”

Greenspan wanted to fight inflation; but the best way to do it was no longer acceptable. A gold standard, he had long ago recognized, would bring with it monetary stability; but to replace the Fed with a commodity standard not subject to control by the government would erode his power. Accordingly the gold standard had to go.

He cast aside the gold standard with a transparent sophism: “A necessary condition of returning to a gold standard is the financial environment which the gold standard itself is presumed to create. … But, if we restore financial stability, what purpose is then served by a return to a gold standard?” (quoting Greenspan). Why a gold standard cannot help create a stable financial environment, but instead presupposes it, Greenspan left unclear. Even less clear was how the Fed was supposed to preserve stability in the absence of the gold standard. Evidently we were to rely on his supreme powers of judgment in steering the economy.

Greenspan in his long career as Fed chairman gained the power and acclaim he coveted; but the crash of 2008, two years after the end of his tenure in office, led to a sharp decline in his reputation.

In their attitude toward compromise, Greenspan is the polar opposite to Murray Rothbard. Rothbard could have tailored his views to win the favor of Arthur Burns, who was a family friend, but he refused to do so. He never abandoned his principles, and he took the measure of Greenspan. Writing about him in 1987, Rothbard observed: “Greenspan’s real qualification is that he can be trusted never to rock the establishment’s boat. He has long positioned himself in the very middle of the economic spectrum. He is, like most other long-time Republican economists, a conservative Keynesian, which in these days is almost indistinguishable from the liberal Keynesians in the Democratic camp.”

In looking over Greenspan’s fall from free-market grace, the melancholy first lines of Browning’s The Lost Leader, addressed to Wordsworth, come to mind: “Just for a handful of silver he left us,/Just for a ribbon to stick in his coat. …”