GeoEconomics

This System is madness.

The short story of our debt-money system aka governmental system (because the politicians are largely “market driven” depend on money from banks, insurance companies, investors):

Let us assume there is only one private Bank.

Let us assume there are only 2 companies in the world that produce the same e.g. tables.

The Bank gives everyone a loan of 50Units with a term of 10 years and an interest rate of 5%.

The money to pay the interest is never generated.

This means company A can only pay back the credit if company A takes away away money from company B. (be cheaper, faster, better, competition)

This creates competition and unemployment when company B goes bankrupt.

Company A might now even have a MONOPOLY on tables, and the prices probably explode.

Creates a bubble for table prices to the point that nobody can afford tables – then the bubble bursts.

Do you think that’s funny?

Not me.

The Bank always wins, because its stake was never high.

You can say it lost 50Units because company B could not pay back the loan and went bankcrupt.

But that is not the case, the private Bank did not borrow the 100% from someone, it had only to borrow 10%/10Units of “real” Central Bank cash money at 0-2% had to borrow.

So 10Units the bank had to borrow 90Units it created itself.

So at the end of the 10 year loan, company B is bankrupt, company A has a monopoly and the bank get’s 63.75Units back – that people worked hard for – what gives the current actual fiat money it’s value.

In theory – 15% unemployment seems to be just a number – in reality – people that own nothing (no house, no garden, no farm, no nothing, can not grow a feed themselves or their families if job is lost, 100% dependence for survival on debt-money) will have to become criminal – just as company A maybe used unfair or even criminal tactics to bankrupt company B (spread lies about their products) – even the super rich want to roam the streets of this planet safe – without constant fear of being kidnapped or robbed. Now let me ask this more productive question:

How would a monetary system look like that is:

  • fostering stability, peace and security
  • fostering creativity and innovation that benefit all of mankind
  • beneficial for a more sustainable survival of mankind aka “everybody” on this beautiful planet

a positive story:

(need more of those)

one fine example what can be done: A city in Brazil was full with plastic waste, the city decided to do something about this (also bad for tourism if your beaches look like trash dumps).

So they accepted a bag full of litter and plastic waste as payment in exchange for one week of free bus and/or train riding. (obviously the bus/train system was still owned by the city and not some private company).

After a few months fishermen even collected trash from the ocean in order to use it as bus tickets.

The city became clean within a few years – the oceans – well that will take a bit longer.

A sentence from Bernard Lietaer, that i not quiet understand:

“money needs to be scarcer than it’s usefulness”

How Currencies Can Be Designed to Promote Environmental and Social Ends

In German:

Der Wahnsinn hat System.

Die kleine Geschichte unseres Schuld-Geld-Systems aka Regierungssystems, weil die Politik maßgeblich sich nach “den Märkten” (Banken, Versicherungen, Investoren) richtet:

Nehmen wir an, es gäbe auf der Welt nur 2 Firmen die das gleiche produzieren z.B Tische.

Die Bank gibt jedem einen Kredit von 50€ mit einer Laufzeit von 10 Jahren und einem Zins von 5%.

Die Zinsen werden nicht erzeugt.

D.h. man kann den Kredit nur zurück zahlen, wenn Firma A Firma B etwas weg nimmt.

So entsteht Konkurrenz und Arbeitslosigkeit, wenn Firma B dann pleite geht.

Firma A hat dann ein MONOPOL auf Tische und kann die Preise ordentlich explodieren lassen. (eine Preis-Blase bildet sich und gefährdet die Stabilität des ganzen Systems)

Findest Du das lustig?

Ich nicht.

Die Bank gewinnt dabei immer, denn ihr Einsatz war nie hoch, da Sie 90% des verliehenen (Giral/Buch)Geldes “aus dem Hut” bzw. Computer gezaubert hat und sich nur 10% “echtes” (Bar)Geld von der EZB für 0% dafür leihen musste.

Ein Satz den ich leider (bisher) nicht verstehe:

“Geld muss immer knapper sein wie sein Nutzen. (!?)”

Vielleicht kann jemand erklären, was das bedeutet.

backup:

How Currencies Can Be Designed to Promote Environmental and Social Ends

Bernard Lietaer is an expert in the design and implementation of currency systems. He has worked in this field for more than 30 years in various roles including central banker in Belgium, fund manager, university professor, and consultant to governments, multinational corporations, and community organizations. His latest book on monetary innovation is People Money: The Promise of Regional Currencies and Money and Sustainability (2012). The monetary system is implicated in many of today’s social and environmental problems. I had a chance to ask Bernard how a better system can be designed.

Allen White: You are well known as a monetary reformer. What led you to study and then rethink the money system?

Bernard Lietaer: As a graduate student at MIT in the late 1960s, I was interested in the application of systems theory to international finance. My thesis, published by the MIT Press in 1970, described how a corporation operating in many countries could optimize currency management. It, among other things, explained how a corporation could best address “floating exchange,” an arrangement, at that time limited to a few currencies in Latin America, in which a currency’s value fluctuates based on supply and demand in the market.

The year after the publication of my thesis, President Nixon took the United States off the gold standard, initiating a global shift to floating exchange that was once a rarity. My research became extremely valuable, and a major U.S. bank negotiated the exclusive rights to my methodology.

I was in management consulting at the time, and my contract with the bank required that I work in a different field for at least five years so that I wouldn’t share my methodology with the bank’s competitors. I took a job advising the largest mining company in Peru and then, after it was nationalized, the Peruvian government itself, where I developed computer models to maximize hard currency earnings. From there, I went back to the Ivory Tower as a professor of international finance, then into the world of central banking via the Central Bank of Belgium. At the Bank, I was tasked with designing the ECU (European Currency Unit), the predecessor to the Euro. Later, after serving as the president of Belgium’s Electronic Payment System, I left government and worked as a currency trader.

Each step in my journey forced me to think about money in a different way: to shift from the perspective of a multinational corporation to that of a developing country to that of an academic to that of a central bank to that of a currency trader. This diversity of perspectives opened my eyes to the merits and flaws of different monetary systems.

AW: How would you describe the prevailing monetary system today?

BL: Today’s monetary system is characterized by a monopoly of scarcity—and debt-based national fiat currencies. Let’s break that down.

In the modern economy, money is inextricably linked to taxation. The government defines money by choosing what it will accept as payment for taxes, and then citizens must work, trade or invest to obtain that money to pay such taxes. Since the abandonment of the gold standard, national currencies have been “fiat” money. “Fiat” here refers to the first words that God spoke in the Latin version of Genesis: fiat lux (“let light be”). In other words, fiat money gains its value simply by virtue of government decree.

Money comes into existence when banks lend. When a bank provides you with a loan or a mortgage, it creates the principal, which you spend, allowing it to circulate in the economy. The bank expects you to pay back not only this principal, but also a certain amount of interest to cover the risk involved in providing the loan. However, the bank does not create any new money for this interest. Instead, it, in effect, sends you into the world to battle everyone else to secure the money required. “Bank-debt money needs to be scarcer than its usefulness” is a quote from monetary economics textbooks. By nature of its creation process, bank-debt money generates scarcity and competition among its users.

I do not think that greed is necessarily ingrained in human nature: it may be cultivated in part by this system of scarcity and competition. But it does not have to be this way. Since money and monetary systems are ultimately social constructs, we can design a monetary system better aligned with our goals on the national and global level.

AW: You have faulted the current monetary system for contributing to growing inequality, environmental degradation, and the erosion of social capital. How does it do so?  

BL: Money is not a neutral and passive medium of exchange, as is generally assumed. It exerts a major influence on human behavior. We design the monetary system, and it, in turn, shapes us, our behavior, and our social relations. The current design incentivizes behaviors antithetical to social and environmental well-being.

For example, our system of debt-based money creates pressure for economic growth because borrowers must secure additional money to pay back the interest on their debt. The payment of interest with debt-based money, in turn, leads to a compounding of interest, which tends to foster exponential growth. However, such exponential growth in economic output is impossible in a world of finite natural resources. Moreover, bank-debt money can be described as an extraction process whose net effect is that money flows to those already at the top, thereby increasing wealth disparities.

Social capital depends on trust, solidarity, and cooperation. These sensibilities are built through voluntary acts of sharing and generosity, such as helping a neighbor or mentoring a student. The monetization of all human transactions promotes the selfish, non-collaborative behaviors that erode community cohesion and, thereby, social capital.

AW: Many of our readers are familiar with the problems caused by monoculture in agriculture. Is monoculture also a problem when it comes to money?

BL: Yes, and some of the deepest thinkers in economics, dissatisfied with the failures of neoclassical orthodoxy, have looked to natural systems for new ideas and solutions. Biologists and complexity experts have shown that the long-term sustainability of a complex flow of networks depends on having the right balance between efficiency and resilience. Efficiency refers to the network’s ability to process a volume of flow per unit of time in an organized fashion. Resilience refers to the network’s ability to cope with change while preserving its integrity. Both of these depend on the same two structural variables—diversity and interconnectivity—but in opposite ways. Efficiency is maximized by reducing diversity and interconnectivity, and resilience is maximized by increasing them. The current economic system puts too much emphasis on efficiency at the expense of resilience. The result is a focus on—some would say obsession with—GDP growth that tallies all economic transactions equally even when they are socially and/or environmentally harmful.

As is the case in agriculture, a monoculture in the money system increases risk. We’ve seen that play out in the crises of the last few decades. Since 1970, there have been 145 banking crises, 76 sovereign debt crises, and 208 monetary crashes around the globe. And if the current system continues to prevail, we’ll see many more.

AW: You have argued for breaking up this monetary monoculture through the use of complementary currencies. How would that work?

BL: Let us start by clarifying what money is: an agreement, within a community, to use some standardized item as a medium of exchange. There is no need to use just one medium. Complementary cooperative currencies can exist alongside our dominant competitive and national currency systems. These currencies can be managed by members of a community, a nongovernmental organization, or business network with the aim of linking unused resources with unmet needs.

A commercial example familiar to most people is frequent flyer miles: they connect the unmet need for airlines of customers’ loyalty with an unused resource, namely, an empty seat on a flight. Whenever there is an unmet need in an economy and an unused resource—and there are many—the two can be linked with a currency. Today, there are approximately 4,000 mature cooperative currencies in operation around the world.

These currencies need not be interest-bearing; indeed, some of them incorporate “demurrage,” a time-related charge for holding onto this currency, which creates an incentive to keep it in circulation. Currencies with demurrage do not contribute to the concentration of wealth and tend to foster a greater sense of community.

AW: Have you witnessed the success of complementary currencies on the ground? If so, what are some examples?

BL: The most frequently used cooperative currency system in the world today is the Local Exchange Trading System (LETS), which was invented in the town of Courtney outside of Vancouver in the early 1980s. After a military base in the town moved, the formerly middle-class town experienced an economic slump, with unemployment rising to 40 percent. But the town still had many unmet needs and a large unused resource in the form of a skilled labor force willing to work. What was missing was a link between the two: that’s what LETS provided. And it has proven to be a great success, encouraging people to use skills they might not have considered valuable (such as cooking, teaching English, or web designing) and giving access to services to people who in the past may not have been able to afford them.

Time dollars provide another example. This system was created by Edgar Cahn, a former speechwriter and counsel to Robert F. Kennedy. The time dollar is equivalent to one hour of service and can be spent on services within a given community, where everyone’s time has equal value. Today, approximately 300 TimeBanks operate in the US and another 300 in the UK, and time banking has spread to almost three dozen additional countries worldwide.

Or consider the Chiemgauer system in Bavaria. Regional nonprofit organizations that wish to participate purchase Chiemgauers for their members at a rate of 100 Chiemgauers for 97 euros. The Chiemgauers can then be used to purchase goods and services in participating stores. As the Chiemgauers are a demurrage currency, people are incentivized to keep them in circulation, rather than hoarding them. Currently, there are 600 participating businesses, and more than 500,000 Chiemgauers in circulation.

Torekes, a currency I helped design, illustrate how complementary currencies can foster greater community. Torekes are in use in Rabot, an immigrant district in the Belgian city of Ghent and the poorest community in the region. We asked residents what they wanted and found that those living in the high-rises dominating the district wanted access to a few square yards of land for gardening. The city had land sitting derelict after a factory moved. An unmet need and an unused resource provided an opportunity for a currency to link them. The city decided to rent out the land in small plots, taking payment in Torekes (Flemish for “little towers”), which people could earn by participating in various urban improvements and beautification activities. The city also arranged for local shops to accept Torekes for specific goods that it wanted to encourage people to buy, such as energy-efficient light bulbs or fresh, seasonal vegetables. The stores could keep the Torekes in circulation or get reimbursed in euros.

AW: How scalable are such complementary currencies? Do they offer a real alternative to the current system?

BL: As I noted before, whenever and wherever there are unmet needs and unused resources, a currency can be designed to link them. Experimentation will be necessary, and when approaching experiments of any kind, and especially social experiments like these, we must be ready to accept failure. Over time, however, the most successful ones will attract the most attention and be replicated. As in any disruptive social innovation, experimentation is essential because we still have much to learn, such as what governance structures are most appropriate for different currency systems. The proliferation of complementary currencies is a testament to human creativity, and I believe they are essential to revamping our socially detrimental monetary system.

AW: If the negative consequences of our monetary system are so clear, why haven’t they been recognized and addressed earlier?

BL: We suffer from a three-layered collective “blind spot” with regard to our money system. The first layer arises from the hegemony of the idea of a single currency. Many people believe that societies have always created, and indeed must create, a monopoly for a single, centrally issued currency. Monopoly has been the rule in many times and places, but there have been exceptions, and such alternative systems fostered economic stability, equitable prosperity, and a longer-term perspective.

The second layer is an indirect result of the ideological warfare between capitalism and communism in the twentieth century. Although the differences between these two systems have been studied ad nauseam, their similarities have not. And among them is a shared belief in a single national currency.

Our institutional framework is the source of the third layer. From the eighteenth century onwards, governance of the money system has been institutionalized through the creation of central banks, which have acted as enforcers of a single currency monopoly in each country.

Multiple forces conspire to keep all three of these blind spots in place. For instance, challenging the hegemony of the monopoly currency puts academics at risk of exclusion from the top conferences and top peer-reviewed economics journals because the gatekeepers in both cases are wedded to the current paradigm. As usual, the costs of nonconformity are high, and the forces of inertia are powerful.

An even deeper obstacle lies in our collective psyche. We are motivated by both greed and a fear of scarcity, both of which lead to an obsessive focus on money, making the issue emotionally charged and discussion difficult.

AW: What role can information technology play in facilitating the use of multiple currencies?

BL: Over the centuries, many different forms of “money” have been invented and used. Today, those in use include bank notes, bonds, and corporate equity as well as gift cards, loyalty points, and community currencies. Digital currencies are the latest addition, with Bitcoin, the first decentralized digital currency, arriving on the monetary stage in 2009. Bitcoin has been followed by a wave of other digital currencies and digital assets that have raised capital while avoiding the high costs of the usual sale of stock in public markets.

Currently, when changing one type of asset into another, one must rely on an intermediary who profits by matching parties with a coincidence of needs. This reliance on matching creates significant barriers, making it nearly impossible for small-scale currencies to be valued against and thus traded for other currencies at market-determined exchange rates. One breakthrough to address this age-old problem is the Bancor protocol. It is named after the proposal made by John Maynard Keynes after World War II for a supranational reserve currency that is nobody’s national currency. Utilizing information technology innovations, particularly “blockchains” that provide transparent, decentralized records of transactions, the Bancor protocol provides an effective way to provide convertibility and liquidity for small-scale complementary currencies without needing a counterparty or an intermediary.

AW: What role can monetary reform play in achieving a Great Transition?

BL: The current monetary system lies at the root of so many contemporary problems. However, because our system of money is a social construct, we can—and indeed, must—change it. A new monetary ecology that combines an array of currencies at various levels—local, regional, national, multinational, and global—can be at the heart of a Great Transition. Such an approach would open up a whole new range of alternatives that can promote the well-being and resilience of both human societies and the environment.

The complementary currencies already in operation today provide glimmers of hope as well as templates for others to adapt according to the needs of their specific communities. By rethinking money and carrying out experiments to connect unused resources and unmet needs, we can help usher in a new era of sustainable abundance.

src: https://www.alternet.org/2017/11/how-currencies-can-be-designed-promote-environmental-and-social-ends/

International Monetary Funds Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard speaks during the World Economic Outlook (WEO) press conference, October 8, 2008 at the IMF Headquarters in Washington DC. The world economy is entering a major downturn in the face of the most dangerous financial shock in mature financial markets since the 1930Õs, according to the WEO. © IMF Staff Photographer Eugene Salazar

Economists: Ooooops!

Greece! Spain! Italy! Portugal! France! Everyone! Listen Up:

…few dead pensioners, closed hospitals and lost jobs later:

“Economists were wrong about Austerity!”

🙈

No! Really? Why is “our leadership” this kind of incompetent?

Christine Madeleine Odette Lagarde (French: [kʁistin madlɛn ɔdɛt laɡaʁd]; née Lallouette, IPA: [laluɛt]; born 1 January 1956) is a French lawyer and politician serving as Managing Director (MD) and Chairwoman of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2011.

Lagarde joined Baker & McKenzie, a large Chicago-based international law firm, in 1981.

IMF’s lending program for distressed European countries was “a very massive plan, totally unexpected, totally counter-treaty, because it wasn’t scheduled in the treaty that we should do a bailout program, as we did.” She also said, “we had essentially a trillion dollars on the table to confront any market attack that would target any country, whether it’s Greece, Spain, Portugal, or anybody within the eurozone.” With respect to the French economy, she stated that besides short-term stimulus efforts: “we must, very decisively, cut our deficit and reduce our debt.”[45]

Liberte, Fraternite, Austerite

will get right-wing radicals elected.

Christine at her time at the IMF was pretty much pro Austerity: Latest News: (2013) “OOOPS! We were wrong”

and: HOW ON EARTH is the President of the ECB Elected?

“the European Council, de facto by those who have adopted the euro, for an eight-year non-renewable term.[2]”

Who the fuck is the European Council?

comprises the heads of state or government of the EU member states, along with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission

WHAT?

“In a rare volte-face, the International Monetary Fund this week admitted that it grossly underestimated the impact of the austerity regime it advised Europeans to adopt.

A paper authored by IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard found that every dollar that governments cut from their budgets actually reduced economic output by $1.50.

The IMF forecast originally that economic activity would be reduced by only $0.50 for every $1.00 fiscal spending cut.

Now this is not the IMF’s official position, mind you. But Blanchard, as chief economist, makes the IMF look shame-faced. Indirectly, at least.

Predictably, this has given considerable ammunition to critics of the bitter austerity prescription that has characterised European governments’ fiscal policies.

Economics is known as the dismal science.

But for the IMF’s critics, this egregious forecasting error — upon which so much policy advice was built — is more than a crime.

It’s a mistake.”

and Kennedy once said: “An Error becomes a mistake – if you refuse to correct it”

Will they correct it?

“The fact is that economics is much more of an art than a science.”

And money is much more a “religion” a system of “believe” than you can imagine.

“Econometricians can factor in x amount of data into a model to show outcome y.

Like actors, who are only as good as their scripts, economists are only as good as the data they input.

Go forth and multiply

How did the IMF get it so wrong? Multipliers. Specifically, the wrong ones.

Although the 18th-century physiocrat, Quesnay, formulated the basis of multipliers in economics, John Maynard Keynes is generally credited with the conceptual modernisation and application of the “multiplier effect”.

Briefly, every dollar that’s spent increases aggregate demand, as that same dollar is spent again and again and again.

It’s this fiscal multiplier that the IMF employed to measure the likely effect of budgetary spending cuts.

Fawlty forecasting

To understand multipliers, here’s a brain teaser for you. Imagine we’re in the 19th-century equivalent of Fawlty Towers.

His Lordship arrives at a hotel and requests a room.

“Certainly, m’lord,” replies the manager.

But the man wants to see the room first. He puts his coat in the cloakroom and goes upstairs to take a shufty.

While he’s gone, the manager steals £5 from his wallet.

He then runs down the street and pays off the, er, lady of the night, to whom he owes five quid.

Said lady then hoofs off to the butcher’s to pay off her £5 worth of sausages. The butcher, in turn, heads over to the baker, where his account is in arrears to the tune of a fiver. The baker pays his £5 to the milkman. And the milkman heads to the hotel to pay the manager the £5 he owes on the room he rented there the last time he met up with the shady lady.

Then the manager replaces the £5 he stole from the toff’s wallet.

His Lordship decides the room is not at all like Hampton Court Palace and leaves.

So, goods were produced.

Services were rendered.

Debts were paid.

There were economic outputs.

GDP — in theory — increased.

And all due to one lousy £5 note.

That’s a multiplier for you.

One more thing: in all instances, credit was extended.

You could consider the aristocrat the government.

Or a bank.

Except, unlike governments, banks don’t give away money; they rent it out.

Meanwhile, back at the IMF…

Blanchard calculated that the IMF utilised a multiplier of 0.5.

In reality, it should have been 1.5. In the IMF’s defence, Blanchard argues that the Fund underestimated the extraordinary financial circumstances of the European economies.

In other words, the IMF was too optimistic about the impact of austerity measures upon GDP, and did not expect the effect upon unemployment would be so severe.

The IMF has admitted that its pursuit of austerity was misguided. AAP

Sorry in short – the whole IMF staff should get fired! Christine Madeleine Odette Lagarde should go to jail!

She and her advisors ruined the Greek and Spain economy and were about to ruin that of Portugal and Italy and France, driving many people to the brink of economic existance.

While allowing right wing nationalism to grow like a mushroom – not enough wrong doing for you?

Greece now officially hates Germany.

Thanks a lot.

It is what always happens when people do not have a mind of their own and do not do their own research and rely on “advisors” from McKinsey or god knows from where. those “experts” are none.

Unfortunately: i predict – the incompetent financial advisory IMF/ECB’s biggest crime is yet to come.

this is how incompetent our leadership is – it relies on experts that pretend to be experts – for the money

Portugal is way better off than Greece!

GO FUCK YOURSELF IMF ECB AND MCKINSEY!

http://theconversation.com/we-were-wrong-imf-report-details-the-damage-of-austerity-11533

 


The Diplomatic history of World War I covers the non-military interactions among the major players during World War I. For the domestic histories see Home front during World War I. For a longer-term perspective see International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919) and Causes of World War I. For the following era see International relations (1919–1939). The major players included Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy (1915)]] and the United States (1917). The major Central Powers included Germany and the Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). Other countries—and their colonies—were also involved. For a detailed chronology see Timeline of World War I.

The non-military diplomatic and propaganda interactions among the nations were designed to build support for the cause, or to undermine support for the enemy.[1][2] Wartime diplomacy focused on five issues: subversion and propaganda campaigns to weaken the morale of the enemy; defining and redefining the war goals, which became harsher as the war went on; luring neutral nations (Italy, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Romania) into the coalition by offering slices of enemy territory; and encouragement by the Allies of nationalistic minority movements inside the Central Powers, especially among Czechs, Poles, and Arabs. In addition, there were multiple peace proposals coming from neutrals, or one side or the other; none of them progressed very far. Some were neutral efforts to end the horrors. Others were propaganda ploys to show one side was being reasonable and the other was obstinate.[3]

War aims

In 1914 both sides expected quick victory and had not formulated long-term goals. An ad-hoc meeting of the French and British ambassadors with the Russian Foreign Minister in early September led to a statement of war aims that was not official, but did represent ideas circulating among diplomats in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, as well as the secondary allies of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Its provisions included:[4]

  • 1) ” The principal object of the three allies should be to break German power and its claim to military and political domination;”
  • 2) “Territorial modifications are to be determined according to the principle of nationality;”
  • 3) Russia should annex certain parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
  • 4) “France should take back Alsace-Lorraine, adding to it if she likes part of Rhenish Prussia and of the Palatine;”
  • 5-7, provisions for new territory for Belgian and Denmark, and the restoration of the Kingdom of Hanover.
  • 8) Austria should become a triple monarchy, upgrading the kingdom of Bohemia.
  • 9) “Serbia should annex Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and northern Albania;”
  • 10-11. Territory should be added to Bulgaria and Greece.
  • 12) “England, France, and Japan should divide the German colonies;”
  • 13) “Germany and Austria should pay a war indemnity.”

No official statement of Allied war aims was issued. The secret treaties remained secret until the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in November 1917 and began publishing them.[5] Socialists had always alleged that capitalists were behind the war in order to line their own pockets, and the evidence of promised new territories invigorated left-wing movements around the world. President Woodrow Wilson regained some of the initiative in January 1918 when he proclaimed his Fourteen Points, the first of which demanded, “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”[6]

Historian Hew Strachan argues that war aims focused on territorial gains were not of central importance anyway. They did not cause the war nor shape its course of action. Rather, he says:

Big ideas, however rhetorical, shaped the war’s purpose more immediately and completely than did more definable objectives….[According to best-selling English author H. G. Wells], ‘We fight’, he declared, ‘not to destroy a nation, but to kill a nest of ideas….Our business is to kill ideas. The ultimate purpose of this war is propaganda, the destruction of certain beliefs and the creation of others.’[7]

The stalemate by the end of 1914 forced serious consideration of long-term goals. Britain, France, Russia and Germany all separately concluded this was not a traditional war with limited goals. Britain, France and Russia became committed to the destruction of German military power, and Germany to the dominance of German military power in Europe. One month into the war, Britain, France and Russia agreed not to make a separate peace with Germany, and discussions began about enticing other countries to join in return for territorial gains. However, as Barbara Jelavich observes, “Throughout the war Russian actions were carried out without real coordination or joint planning with the Western powers.”[8] There was no serious three-way coordination of strategy, nor was there much coordination between Britain and France before 1917.

Approaches to diplomacy

Both sides employed secret treaties to entice neutral nations to join them in return for a promise of spoils when victory was achieved. They were kept secret until the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917 and began publishing all the details on the Allied side. The Allies especially promised that after defeating the Ottoman Empire they would give large slices in return for immediate help in the war. Some territories were promised to several recipients, on the principle that conflicts could be sorted out after victory was achieved. Some promises therefore had to be broken, and that left permanent bitter legacies, Especially in Italy.[9][10]

Important secret treaties of this era include the secretly concluded treaty of Ottoman–German alliance signed on August 2, 1914. It treaty provided that Germany and Turkey would remain neutral in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but if Russia intervened “with active military measures” the two countries would become military allies.[11] Another important secret treaty was the Treaty of London, concluded on April 26, 1915, in which Italy was promised certain territorial concessions in exchange for joining the war on the Triple Entente (Allied) side.[12] The Treaty of Bucharest, concluded between Romania and the Triple Entente powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Russia) on August 17, 1916; under this treaty, Romania pledged to attack Austria-Hungary and not to seek a separate peace in exchange for certain territorial gains. Article 16 of that treaty provided that “The present arrangement shall be held secret.”[13] Blaming the war in part on secret treaties, President Wilson called in his Fourteen Points for “open covenants, openly arrived at.”

The two sides had strikingly different approaches to diplomacy. The military leadership of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his deputy General Erich Ludendorff increasingly controlled Germany and the other Central Powers. They worked around the Kaiser and largely ignored the politicians and diplomats; they focused on military supremacy.[14] The most dramatic example came when military command decided on unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain in early 1917, over the objections of the Prime Minister and other civilian leaders. Historian Cathal Nolan says their strategy was, “Germans must win fast and win everything or lose everything in a war of exhaustion: knock out Russia in 1917, defeat France and starve Britain, all before the Americans arrived in sufficient numbers to make a real difference on the Western Front.”[15] A military approach meant that victory was to be achieved by winning great campaigns against the main enemy armies. Allies were useful for providing hundreds of thousands of bayonets, and access to critical geographical points.

The Allies had a more complex multi-dimensional approach that included critical roles for diplomacy, finance, propaganda and subversion.[16] By 1917 talk of a compromise solution was suppressed and the British and French war aim was to permanently destroy German militarism. When the United States joined in, Woodrow Wilson likewise in his 14 points emphasized the need to destroy militarism.[17] Austria and Turkey were not the main targets, and a separate peace with either or both of them was always an option. The Allies bargained with neutrals such as Italy by promising them when victory came, the Central Powers would be broken up and critical territories would be given to the winners. In the Treaty of London (1915) Italy was promised several large slices of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[18] Russia was promised Constantinople in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915.[19] the Jews were promised a homeland in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, but the Arabs had already been promised a sovereign state in Turkish-controlled regions. Aspiring nationalities were promised their own homelands. France was promised Alsace-Lorraine, which had been ceded to Germany in 1871.

In terms of finance, the British generously loaned money to Russia, France, Italy and smaller allies. When its own money ran out, the United States replaced it in early 1917 with even larger loans. The Allies put a heavy emphasis on “soft power” including economic aid and trade, and propaganda. For example, Britain cut off all shipments of cotton to Germany, but at the same time subsidized the American cotton industry by large purchases, to make sure that the rural South supported the war effort.[20] Historians Richard D. Heffner and Alexander Heffner point to the “outstanding success of British propaganda” in molding American opinion, while “Germany’s feeble propaganda effort proved highly ineffective.”[21] The Allied propaganda emphasised the triumph of liberal ideas, and a war to end all wars—themes with a broad international appeal. The Germans kept quiet about their war aims of dominating all of Europe, for they realized it would not have a wide appeal. However the German Foreign Ministry realize the value of subversion in a total war. It used money and propaganda to attempt to undermine morale of the allies, including Muslims in the British, Russian and Ottoman empires. They had even more success in subsidizing far left anti-war subversive elements, especially in Russia.[22] Heavy-handed German militarism, especially seen in the rape of Belgium—the widespread and systematic atrocities went on year after year—and the sinking of a large passenger liner the Lusitania—became major themes in Allied propaganda warning against the evils of militarism. The Allies were embarrassed by its large Russian ally—it was a non-democratic autocracy that sponsored pogroms. The overthrow of the Tsarist regime in March 1917 by Russian liberals greatly facilitated American entry into the war as President Wilson could for the first time proclaim a crusade for idealistic goals.[23]

Germany avoided internal discussions of its war aims, because debate threatened political unity at home and with allies. As late as May 1917 the Chancellor warned the Reichstag that a discussion of war aims would be unwise.[24] In January 1917 Germany made a major strategic blunder that historian Hew Strachan speculates may have cost it victory in the war. The German navy launched a full-scale blockade of Britain, using its U-boats to sink all merchant ships of whatever nationality without warning. This was in violation of international law and of its solemn promises to the United States. The military made the decision, rejecting civilian advice, knowing it meant war with the United States but it was Germany’s last chance for a decisive victory before the Americans would be able to fully mobilize. By ignoring civilian advice the military failed to appreciate that Britain was financially bankrupt, and could no longer purchase needed raw materials nor provide urgently needed financial aid to its friends. Strachan maintains the new German submarine strategy “saved Britain” because Berlin had lost sight of how close it was to success in ruining the critical financial component of British strategy.[25]

Toward a League of Nations

In the course of the war both sides had to clarify their long-term war aims. By 1916 in Britain and in neutral United States, long-range thinkers had begun to design a unified international organization to prevent future wars. Historian Peter Yearwood argues that when the new coalition government of David Lloyd George took power in December 1916, there was widespread discussion among intellectuals and diplomats of the desirability of establishing such an organization, when Lloyd George was challenged by Wilson to state his position Regarding the postwar, he endorsed such an organization. Wilson himself Included in his Fourteen Points in January 1918 a “league of nations to insure peace and justice.” British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, argued that, as a condition of durable peace, “behind international law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.”[26]

Financing the war

The total direct cost of war, for all participants including those not listed here, was about $80 billion (in 1913 US dollars) Since $1 billion in $1913 = about $25 billion in 2017 US dollars the total cost comes to about $2 trillion in 2017 dollars. Direct cost is figured as actual expenditures during war minus normal prewar spending. It excludes postwar costs such as pensions, interest, and veteran hospitals. Loans to/from allies are not included in “direct cost.” Repayment of loans after 1918 is not included.[27] The total direct cost of the war as a percent of wartime national income:

  • Allies: Britain, 37%; France, 26%; Italy, 19%; Russia, 24%; United States, 16%.
  • Central Powers: Austria-Hungary, 24%; Germany, 32%; Turkey unknown.

The amounts listed below are presented in terms of 1913 US dollars, where $1 billion then equals about $25 billion in 2017.[28]

  • Britain had a direct war cost about $21.2 billion; it made loans to Allies and Dominions of $4.886 billion, and received loans from the United States of $2.909 billion.
  • France had a direct war cost about $10.1 billion; it made loans to Allies of $1.104 billion, and received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of $2.909 billion.
  • Italy had a direct war cost about $4.5 billion; it received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of $1.278 billion.
  • The United States had a direct war cost about $12.3 billion; it made loans to Allies of $5.041 billion.
  • Russia had a direct war cost about $7.7 billion; it received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of $2.289 billion.[29]

In 1914 Britain had by far the largest and most efficient financial system in the world.[30] Roger Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis argue:

To prosecute industrial war required the mobilisation of economic resources for the mass production of weapons and munitions, which necessarily entitled fundamental changes in the relationship between the state (the procurer), business (the provider), labour (the key productive input), and the military (the consumer). In this context, the industrial battlefields of France and Flanders intertwined with the home front that produced the materials to sustain a war over four long and bloody years.[31]

The two governments agreed that financially Britain would support the weaker Allies and that France would take care of itself.[32] In August 1914, Henry Pomeroy Davison, a Morgan partner, traveled to London and made a deal with the Bank of England to make J.P. Morgan & Co. the sole underwriter of war bonds for Great Britain and France. The Bank of England became a fiscal agent of J.P. Morgan & Co., and vice versa. Over the course of the war, J.P. Morgan loaned about $1.5 billion (approximately $21 billion in today’s dollars) to the Allies to fight against the Germans.[33]:63 Morgan also invested in the suppliers of war equipment to Britain and France, thus profiting from the financing and purchasing activities of the two European governments.

Britain made heavy loans to Tsarist Russia; the Lenin government after 1920 refused to honor them, causing long-term issues.[34]

Allies

Great Britain

British diplomacy during the war focused on new initiatives in cooperation with the leading allies, promote propaganda efforts with neutrals, and initiatives to undermine the German economy, especially through a naval blockade. In 1915, an Allied conference began operations in Paris to coordinate financial support for allies, munitions productions, and rationing of raw materials to neutrals who might otherwise reship them to Germany. Britain established a blacklist, a shipping control commission and a ministry of blockade.[35]

Entry

On 4 August, the King took Britain (and his Empire) into the Great War. The reasons for declaring war were complex. The main reason was that Britain was required by treaty to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality. The German invasion of Belgium was, therefore, the casus belli. It legitimized and galvanized popular and Liberal Party support for the war. The Liberals, not the Conservatives, needed the moral outrage over Belgium to justify going to war, while the Conservatives called for intervention from the start of the crisis on the grounds of realpolitik and the balance of power.[36]

Strategic risk posed by German control of the Belgian and ultimately French coast was considered unacceptable. German guarantees of post-war behaviour were cast into doubt by her blasé treatment of Belgian neutrality. However, the Treaty of London had not committed Britain on her own to safeguard Belgium’s neutrality. Moreover, naval war planning demonstrated that Britain herself would have violated Belgian neutrality by blockading her ports (to prevent imported goods passing to Germany) in the event of war with Germany.

Rather Britain’s relationship with her Entente partners, both France and Russia, were equally significant factors. The Foreign Secretary Edward Grey argued that the secret naval agreements with France (although they had not been approved by the Cabinet) created a moral obligation vis a vis Britain and France. What is more, in the event that Britain abandoned its Entente friends, it was feared that if Germany won the war, or the Entente won without British support, then, either way, Britain would be left without any friends. This would have left both Britain and her Empire vulnerable to attack.

British Foreign office mandarin Eyre Crowe said:

“Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen. (a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. What will be the position of a friendless England? (b) Or France and Russia win. What would be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?”[37]:544

Balfour Declaration: Palestine and Jewish home land

The British and French decided that practically the entire Ottoman Empire would be divided up among the winners, leaving only a small slice for the Turks. In Asia, The French would get the northern half, and the British would get the southern half. British Cabinet paid special attention to the status of Palestine, looking at multiple complex factors. The steady advance of British armies moving up from Egypt indicated that Palestine and nearby areas would soon be under Allied control, and it was best to announce plans before that happened. In October 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, promised Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca the Arab leader in Arabia, that Britain would support Arab national ambitions in return for cooperation against the Turks.[38] London thought there so much new land would become available that what Balfour called a “small notch” given to the Jews would not be a problem. The Zionist movement was gaining strength in the Jewish communities across Europe, including Britain and the United States. Promising them a home land would galvanize their support. Different Christian groups, especially Biblically-oriented Protestants, had an intense interest in the Holy Land, and in the Biblical predictions that indicated Christ could not return until the Jews regained their promised land. Finally British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour himself had a long-standing Concerned with pogroms against Jews in Eastern Europe, and for years had been looking for ways to resettle them outside Russia. He had many in-depth conversations with the Zionist leader in Britain, Chaim Weitzman, and came up with a plan that Lloyd George and the cabinet approved. In November 1917, Balfour made a very short official announcement regarding Palestine. He promised a “national home” for the Jewish people, And said nothing would be done to prejudice the rights of the Arabs. He made no mention of statehood. His statement read:

His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[39][40]

President Wilson had known about the plan since March, but had been noncommittal whether to support it. Finally London asked directly his opinion and he secretly told House to tell them that he approved it. Historian Frank W. Brecher says, Wilson’s “deep Christian sentiment” led him to seek “a direct governing role in the Near East in the name of peace, democracy and, especially, Christianity.” In 1922, Congress officially endorsed Wilson’s support through passage of the Lodge-Fish Resolution.[41][42] The League of Nations incorporated the Declaration into the mandate over Palestine it awarded to Britain on 24 July 1922.[43]

On the other hand, pro-Palestinian historians have argued that Wilson and Congress ignored democratic values in favour of “biblical romanticism” When they endorsed the Declaration. They point to a pro-Zionist lobby, which was active at a time when the small number of unorganized Arab Americans were not heard. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department opposed the endorsement fearing it would alienate Arabs.[44] In terms of British diplomacy, Danny Gutwein argues that the Declaration was the victory of the “radical” faction in the British government debating policy regarding the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The radicals proposed to partition that Empire In order to solidify Britain’s control of the Middle East. The “reformist” faction lost.[45]

Blockade of Germany

The Blockade of Germany By the Royal Navy was a highly effective technique to prevent Germans from importing food, raw materials, and other supplies. It repeatedly violated neutral rights, and the United States repeatedly objected. British diplomacy had to deal with that crisis. The loophole in the blockade system was shipments to neutral countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, which then sold the supplies to Germany. To stop that the British closely monitor shipments to neutral countries, declared almost all commodities were contraband and would be seized, rationed imports to neutrals, and searched neutral merchant ships Allied ports. They also blacklisted American firms know to trade with Germany.[46] The United States protested but Wilson decided to tolerate Britain’s policy.[47]

France

By 1914 French foreign policy was based on an alliance with Russia, and an informal understanding with Britain; both assumed that the main threat was from Germany.[48][49][50]

The crisis of 1914 was unexpected, and when Germany mobilized its forces in response to Russian mobilization, France also had to mobilize. Germany then invaded Belgium as part of its Schlieffen Plan to win the war by encircling Paris. The plan failed and the war settled into a very bloody deadlock on the Western Front with practically no movement until 1918.[51]

Britain took the lead in most diplomatic initiatives, but Paris was consulted on all key points.[52] The Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 with Britain called for breaking up the Ottoman Empire and dividing it into spheres of French and British influence. France was to get control of southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.[53]

French credit collapsed in 1916 and Britain began loaning large sums to Paris. The J.P. Morgan & Co bank in New York assumed control of French loans in the fall of 1916 and relinquished it to the U.S. government when the U.S. entered the war in 1917.[54][55]

France suffered very heavy losses, in terms of battle casualties, financing, and destruction in the German-occupied areas. At the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vengeance against defeated Germany was the main French theme, and Prime Minister Clemenceau was largely effective against the moderating influences of the British and Americans. France obtained large (but unspecified) reparations, regained Alsace-Lorraine and obtained mandates to rule parts of former German colonies in Africa.[56]

Russia

Leadership

Historians agree on the poor quality of Russia’a top leadership. The tsar made all the final decisions, but he repeatedly was given conflicting advice and typically made the wrong choice. He set up a deeply flawed organizational structure that was inadequate for the high pressures and instant demands of wartime. Stevenson, for example, points to the” disastrous consequences of deficient civil-military liaison” where the civilians and generals were not in contact with each other. The government was entirely unaware of its fatal weaknesses and remained out of touch with public opinion; the foreign minister had to warn the tsar that “unless he yielded to the popular demand and unsheathed the sword on Serbia’s behalf, he would run the risk of revolution and the loss of his throne.” The tsar yielded and lost his throne anyway. Stevenson concludes:

Russian decision-making in July [1914] was more truly a tragedy of miscalculation…a policy of deterrence that failed to deter. Yet [like Germany] it too rested on assumptions that war was possible without domestic breakdown, and that it could be waged with a reasonable prospect of success. Russia was more vulnerable to social upheaval than any other Power. Its socialists were more estranged from the existing order than those elsewhere in Europe, and a strike wave among the industrial workforce reached a crescendo with the general stoppage in St. Petersburg in July 1914.[57]

Tsar Nicholas II spent much of his time at Army headquarters near the front lines, where his proclivity to misjudge leadership qualities, and misunderstand strategy, did the most damage. Meanwhile, morale plunged on the home front, the soldiers lacked rifles and adequate food, the economy was stretched to the limits and beyond, and strikes became widespread. The tsar paid little attention. Tsarina Alexandra, increasingly under the spell of Grigori Rasputin, inadvisedly passed along his suggested names for senior appointments to the tsar. Thus in January 1916 the tsar replaced Prime Minister Ivan Goremykin with Boris Stürmer. Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov was not a powerful player. Historian Thomas Otte finds that, “Sazonov felt too insecure to advance his positions against stronger men….He tended to yield rather than to press home his own views…. At the critical stages of the July crisis Sazonov was inconsistent and showed an uncertain grasp of international realities.[58] The tsar fired Sazonov in July 1916 and gave his ministry as an extra portfolio to Prime Minister Stürmer. The French ambassador was aghast, depicting Stürmer as, “worse than a mediocrity – a third rate intellect, mean spirit, low character, doubtful honesty, no experience, and no idea of state business.”[59]

Propaganda

One of Russia’s greatest challenges was motivating its highly diverse population that often lacked loyalty to the tsar. One solution was to avoid conscripting certain distrusted ethnic minorities.[60] Another was a heavy dose of propaganda—using cartoons and verbal jokes—that ridiculed Kaiser Wilhelm II. The tactic backfired as Russians turned it against their own tsar.[61] The stories of miseries, defeats and incompetence told by recruits on leave home gave a more powerful and negative narrative to every village; local anti-draft riots became common.[62] Britain and France tried to meet Russia’s problems with money and munitions, but the long supply line was so tenuous that Russian soldiers were very poorly equipped in comparison with their opponents in battle.

Meanwhile, Berlin, aware of the near-revolutionary unrest in Russia in the previous decade, launched its own propaganda war. The Foreign Ministry disseminated fake news reports that had the desired effect of demoralizing Russian soldiers.[63] Berlin’s most successful tactic was to support far-left Russian revolutionaries dedicated to attacking and overthrowing the tsar. The German foreign ministry provided over 50 million gold marks to the Bolsheviks, and in 1917 secretly transported Lenin and his top aides from their exile in Switzerland across Germany to Russia. Later that year they overthrew the liberal regime and began their march to control all of Russia.[64][65][66] The Bolsheviks concentrated much of their propaganda on POWs from the German and Austrian armies. When Russia left the war in 1917 these prisoners returned home and many carried back support for revolutionary ideas that quickly infected their comrades.[67]

February Revolution

When the tsarist regime collapsed internally in February 1917, it was succeeded for eight months by the Provisional Government, a liberal regime headed by Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky. Pavel Milyukov, leader of the moderate KADET party, became Foreign Minister.[68] Many ambassadors and senior aides were tsarist appointees who resigned, so that the Foreign Ministry could barely function. Kerensky and Milyukov wanted to continue the tsarist foreign policy especially regarding the war. They still hoped to gain control of The Straits around Constantinople. The British wanted to support Russian morale, while distrusting the depth of its popular support and capabilities. After long discussions the British settled on a cautious policy which was, “to give the impression of support for the Provisional Government, while at the same time delaying actual support in the form of munitions until the British needs were met and real evidence of Russian intention to prosecute the war actively was forthcoming.”[69]

The Provisional Government, even after giving Kerensky dictatorial powers, failed to meet the challenges of war weariness, growing discontent among peasants and workers, and intrigues by the Bolsheviks. Public opinion, especially in the Army, had turned against the sacrifices for a hopeless war. The Bolsheviks proposed a revolutionary foreign policy that would immediately end the war and promote revolution across Europe.[70]

Bolshevik versus White

After Lenin and his Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky regime in the “October Revolution” of 1917 (it was November by the Western calendar) Russia plunged into civil war, pitting the Bolsheviks against a series of “White” opponents led by tsarist generals.[71][72] Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland successfully broke away and became independent countries. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan tried to do the same but were later retaken by the Bolsheviks. Lloyd George and French general Ferdinand Foch briefly considered an alliance with the Bolsheviks against Germany. Instead the Allies intervened militarily to guard against a German takeover, and in practice to help the counter-revolutionaries. interventionist forces arrived from Britain, the United States, Japan, as well as France, Estonia, Poland, and Finland. The Bolsheviks proved successful, and after defeating them all by 1920 consolidated its hold on what became the Soviet Union (USSR). Lenin moved the national capital to Moscow. Diplomatically the new country was an unrecognized pariah state; only the Danish Red Cross would talk to them officially. Moscow was excluded from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It was deeply distrusted because of its support for revolutionary movements across Europe. However, only the communist revolution in Hungary was successful, and then only for a few months. However, after the failure of sponsored uprisings, Lenin took a more peaceful approach and one by one set up trade relations and after that diplomatic relations with the powers, starting with Britain and Germany in 1921. The United States was the last to act, with official recognition in 1933.[73]

Belgium

Although the German invasion of Belgium in 1914 was the major factor in causing British entry into the war, the government of Belgium itself played a small role in diplomatic affairs.[74] Its main role came as a recipient of relief from neutral countries, and its use by the Allies is a propaganda weapon against the Germans, and their emphasis on the atrocities involved in the Rape of Belgium. On 2 August 1914, the German government demanded that German armies be given free passage through Belgian territory. This was refused by the Belgian government on 3 August.[75] King Albert I addressed his Parliament on 4 August, saying “Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Belgium. The strength of our right and the need of Europe for our autonomous existence make us still hope that the dreaded events will not occur.”[76] The same day German troops Invaded the dawn. Almost all of Belgium was occupied for the entire war, with the exception of a sliver in the far west, which was under the control of the Belgian Army. The government itself was relocated to the city of Sainte-Adresse in France; it still controlled the Belgian Congo in Africa. Belgium officially continued to fight the Germans, but the amount of combat was nominal. Belgium never joined the Allies. However, its foreign minister Paul Hymans was successful in securing promises from the allies that amounted to co-belligerency. Britain, France and Russia pledged in the “Declaration of Sainte-Adresse” in February 1916 that Belgian would be included in the peace negotiations, its independence would be restored, and that it would receive a monetary compensation for Germany for the damages. At the Paris peace conference in 1919, Belgium officially ended its historic neutral status, and became first in line to receive reparations payments from Germany. However, it received only a small bit of German territory, and was rejected in its demands for all of Luxembourg and part of the Netherlands. It was given colonial mandates over the German colonies of Rwanda and Burundi. Hymans became the leading spokesman for the small countries at Paris, and became president of the first assembly of the new League of Nations. When war began in 1914, Hymans met with President Wilson in Washington and got major promises of relief and food support. Relief was directed primarily by an American Herbert Hoover and involved several agencies: Commission for Relief in Belgium, American Relief Administration, and Comité National de Secours et d’Alimentation.[77]

Japan

Japan joined the Allies, seized German holdings in China and in the Pacific islands, cut deals with Russia and put heavy pressure on China in order to expand.[78] In 1915 it secretly made the Twenty-One Demands on the new and fragile Republic of China. The demands included control over former German holdings, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, as well as joint ownership of a major mining and metallurgical complex in central China, prohibitions on China’s ceding or leasing any coastal areas to a third power, and other political, economic and military controls. The result was intended to reduce China to a Japanese protectorate. In the face of slow negotiations with the Chinese government, widespread anti-Japanese sentiment in China and international condemnation, Japan was obliged to withdraw the final group of demands when treaties were signed in May 1915.[79]

Japan’s hegemony in northern China was facilitated through other international agreements. One with Russia in 1916 helped to further secure Japan’s influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Agreements with France, Britain, and the United States in 1917 recognized Japan’s new territorial gains. Japanese loans to China tied it even closer. After the Bolshevik takeover Russia in late 1917 the Japanese army moved to occupy Russian Siberia as far west as Lake Baikal. After getting China to allow transit rights, more than 70,000 Japanese troops joined the much smaller units of the Allied expeditionary force sent to Siberia in July 1918 as part of the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War.[80]

China

China was neutral at the start of the war, but that left her in a weak position as Japanese and British military forces in 1914 liquidated Germany’s holdings in China.[81] Japan occupied the German military colony in Qingdao, and occupied portions of Shandong Province. China was financially chaotic, highly unstable politically, and militarily very weak. Its best hope was to attend the postwar peace conference, and hope to find friends would help block the threats of Japanese expansion. China declared war on Germany in August 1917 as a technicality to make it eligible to attend the postwar peace conference. They considered sending a token combat unit to the Western Front, but never did so.[82][83] British diplomats were afraid that the U.S. and Japan would displace Britain’s leadership role in the Chinese economy. Britain sought to play Japan and the United States against each other, while at the same time maintaining cooperation among all three nations against Germany.[84]

In January 1915, Japan secretly issued an ultimatum of Twenty-One Demands to the Chinese government. They included Japanese control of former German rights, 99 year leases in southern Manchuria, an interest in steel mills, and concessions regarding railways. China did have a seat at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. However it was refused a return of the former German concessions and China had to accept the Twenty-One demands, although they had been softened somewhat because of pressure from the United States on Japan. A major reaction to this humiliation was a surge in Chinese nationalism expressed in the May Fourth Movement.[85]

Romania

WWI Poster Rumania

King Ferdinand (right) defies the German Kaiser in this British poster.

Romania, a small rural Orthodox nation of 7,500,000 people in 54,000 square miles of territory, was neutral for the first two years of the war. It had the only oil fields in Europe, and Germany eagerly bought its petroleum, as well as food exports. King Carol favored Germany but after his death in 1914, King Ferdinand and the nation’s political elite favored the Entente. For Romania, the highest priority was taking Transylvania from Hungary, thus adding ca. 5,200,000 people, 54% (according to 1910 census) or 57% (according to the 1919 and 1920 censuses) of them Romanians. The Allies wanted Romania to join its side in order to cut the rail communications between Germany and Turkey, and to cut off Germany’s oil supplies. Britain made loans, France sent a military training mission, and Russia promised modern munitions. The Allies promised at least 200,000 soldiers to defend Romania against Bulgaria to the south, and help it invade Austria. In August 1916 Romania entered the war on the Allied side. The Romanian army was poorly trained, badly equipped and inadequately officered. Romania did invade Austria-Hungary, but was soon thrown back, and faced a second front when Bulgarian troops, supported by German and Ottoman forces, invaded in Dobruja. By the end of 1916, two thirds of the country (including the capital Bucharest) were occupied by the Central Powers and only Moldavia remained free. The Allied promises proved illusory, and when Romanian oilfields were threatened, the British destroyed the Ploiești oilfields to keep them out of German hands. On July 22, 1917, the Romanians launched a joint offensive with Russia against the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, around Mărăști and the lower part of the Siret river, which resulted in the Battle of Mărăști. Although there was some initial success, a counter-offensive by the Central Powers in Galicia stopped the Romanian-Russian offensive. The subsequent German and Austrian-Hungarian push to knock Romania out of the war was stopped at Mărășești and Oituz by the Romanian and Russian forces. When Russia collapsed in late 1917, the Romanian cause was hopeless, and Romania had no choice but to conclude the Armistice of Focșani on 9 December 1917 and in May 1918 the Treaty of Bucharest. It demobilized its surviving soldiers; nearly half the 750,000 men (335,706)[86] it had recruited were dead, and the economy was ruined. On 10 November 1918, as the Central Powers were all surrendering, Romania joined again the Allied side. On 28 November 1918, the Romanian representatives of Bukovina voted for union with the Kingdom of Romania, followed by the proclamation of a Union of Transylvania with Romania on 1 December 1918 by the representatives of Transylvanian Romanians gathered at Alba Iulia, while the representatives of the Transylvanian Saxons approved the act on 15 December at an assembly in Mediaș. A similar gathering was held by the minority Hungarians in Cluj, on 22 December, to reaffirm their allegiance to Hungary. The Romanian control of Transylvania, which had also a minority Hungarian-speaking population of 1,662,000 (31.6%, according to the census data of 1910), was widely resented in the new nation state of Hungary. This started the Hungarian-Romanian War of 1919 between Romania and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which also waged parallel conflicts with Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The conflict with Romania ended with a partial Romanian occupation of Hungary.[87][88]

Greece

The Greek government was neutral, with the King favoring Germany, and the government favoring the Allies. In 1915 Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos negotiated with the Allies, offering soldiers and especially a geographical launching point for attacks on the Straits. Greece itself wanted control of Constantinople. Russia vetoed the Greek proposal, because its main war goal was to control the Straits, and take control of Constantinople. In 1915, the British and French agreed to the Russian demands.[89] Venizelos invited a joint Franco-British (and later also Russian) expeditionary force, formed in part by withdrawals from Gallipoli, transforming Salonika into an Allied military base.[90] Forces began to arrive on 3 October 1915. In the early summer of 1916, the Athens government under King Constantine handed over Fort Rupel to the Germans, believing it a neutral act, though claimed as a betrayal by the Venizelists. Nonetheless, the Allies still tried to swing the official Athens government to their side. From their positions in Greece, Allied forces fought the war from Greek territory, engaging Bulgarian forces when they invaded Greece in August 1916 in the Battle of Struma. There was little movement on the front until the spring of 1918 and the Greek victory at the Battle of Skra-di-Legen, followed by the Allied offensive in autumn 1918 that broke German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian lines.

Greece’s brief role in the war was beneficial for the country in securing new territorial expansion (Western Thrace and Smyrna), but it caused political and social turmoil that tore Greece into two hostile political camps, known as the “National Schism“.[91]

American entry in 1917

American entry into the war came in April 1917, after 2 1/2 years of efforts by President Woodrow Wilson to keep the United States neutral.

American neutrality

Americans had no inkling that a war was approaching in 1914. Over 100,000 were caught unaware when the wars started when stuff, having traveled to Europe for tourism, business or to visit relatives. Their repatriation was handled by Herbert Hoover, an American private citizen based in London. The U.S. government, under the firm control of President Wilson, was neutral. The president insisted that all government actions be neutral, and that the belligerents must respect that neutrality according to the norms of international law. Wilson told the Senate in August 1914 when the war began that the United States, “must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.” He was ambiguous whether he meant the United States as a nation or meant all Americans as individuals.[92] Wilson has been accused of violating his own rule of neutrality. Later that month he explained himself privately to his top foreign policy advisor Colonel House, who recalled the episode later:

I was interested to hear him express as his opinion what I had written him some time ago in one of my letters, to the effect that if Germany won it would change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation. He also spoke of his deep regret, as indeed I did to him in that same letter, that it would check his policy for a better international ethical code. He felt deeply the destruction of Louvain [in Belgium], and I found him as unsympathetic with the German attitude as is the balance of America. He goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany’s part in this war, and almost allows his feeling to include the German people as a whole rather than the leaders alone. He said German philosophy was essentially selfish and lacking in spirituality. When I spoke of the Kaiser building up the German machine as a means of maintaining peace, he said, “What a foolish thing it was to create a powder magazine and risk someone’s dropping a spark into it!” He thought the war would throw the world back three or four centuries. I did not agree with him. He was particularly scornful of Germany’s disregard of treaty obligations, and was indignant at the German Chancellor’s designation of the Belgian Treaty as being “only a scrap of paper”….But although the personal feeling of the President was with the Allies, he insisted then and for many months after, that this ought not to affect his political attitude, which he intended should be one of strict neutrality. He felt that he owed it to the world to prevent the spreading of the conflagration, that he owed it to the country to save it from the horrors of war.[93]

Apart from an Anglophile element supporting Britain, public opinion in 1914-1916 strongly favored neutrality. Wilson kept the economy on a peacetime basis, and made no preparations or plans for the war. He insisted on keeping the army and navy on its small peacetime bases. Indeed, Washington refused even to study the lessons of military or economic mobilization that had been learned so painfully across the sea.[94]

Submarine issue

The most important indirect strategy used by the belligerents was the blockade: starve the enemy of food and the military machine will be crippled and perhaps the civilians will demand an end to the war. The Royal Navy successfully stopped the shipment of most war supplies and food to Germany. Neutral American ships that tried to trade with Germany (which international law clearly allowed), were seized or turned back. The strangulation came about very slowly, because Germany and its allies controlled extensive farmlands and raw materials, but it eventually worked because Germany and Austria took so many farmers into their armies. By 1918 the German cities were on the verge of starvation; the front-line soldiers were on short rations and were running out of essential supplies. The Allied blockade had done its job. Germany responded with its own submarine-based blockade of Britain. When the large passenger liner Lusitania was sunk in 1915 with the loss of over 100 American lives, Wilson made clear the American objection:

lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative.[95]

The Lusitania sinking was the event that decisively swung American opinion; do it again and would be grounds for a declaration of war by the United States. The British frequently violated America’s neutral rights by seizing ships, but they did not drown anyone.[96] Berlin acquiesced, ordering its submarines to avoid passenger ships. But by January 1917 Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided that unrestricted submarine attacks on all American ships headed to Britain blockade was the only way it could win the war. They knew that meant war with the United States, but they gambled that they could win before America’s potential strength could be mobilized. They vastly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and how much that would weaken Britain; they did not figure out that convoys would defeat their efforts. They were correct in seeing that the United States was so weak militarily that it could not be a factor on the Western Front for more than a year. The civilian government in Berlin objected to the plan, but the Kaiser sided with the military; the civlian government in Berlin was not in charge.[97]

Wilson, as he made clear in his Fourteen Points of January 1918, believed that peace would never come to a world that contained aggressive, powerful, non-democratic militaristic states. Peace required a world based on free democracies. There was never a possibility for compromise between these polar situations. America had to fight for democracy, or it would be fighting perpetually against ever-stronger evil enemies (stronger because they would gobble up weak neighbors whenever they could.)[98]

Ethnic groups

Ethnic groups in the United States became involved on both sides, putting pressure on the Wilson administration to either be neutral, or to give greater support to the Allies. Jewish Americans were hostile to Russia, but when the tsarist regime fell in February 1916, their objection to supporting the Allies fell away. When the British issued the Balfour Declaration in late 1917, which Wilson source, Jewish support for the Allied cause surged. Irish Catholics were very hostile to supporting Great Britain, but Wilson neutralized that problem by Seeming to promise the issue of Irish independence would be on his agenda after the war. He did not fulfill that promise, however, leading to furious outrage among Irish Catholics, who played a powerful role in the Democratic Party in most large cities. In 1919 they opposed the League of Nations, and in 1920 they gave lukewarm support to the Democratic presidential ticket.[99] German American ethnics strongly supported neutrality; very few spoke out on behalf of Germany itself. When the United States declared war, they went silent and were closely monitored for possible disloyalty. There was no actual disloyalty, but the political voice of the German-American community was greatly diminished.[100] Scandinavians generally favored neutrality, but like the Germans they had few spokesmen in Congress or high office.[101]

National security

By 1916 a new factor was emerging—a sense of national self-interest and nationalism. The unbelievable casualty figures were sobering—two vast battles caused over one million casualties each. Clearly this war would be a decisive episode in the history of the world. Every American effort to find a peaceful solution was frustrated. Henry Ford managed to make pacifism look ridiculous by sponsoring a private peace mission that accomplished nothing. German agents added a comic opera touch. The agent in charge of propaganda left his briefcase on the train, where an alert Secret Service agent snatched it up. Wilson let the newspapers publish the contents, which indicated a systematic effort by Berlin to subsidize friendly newspapers and block British purchases of war materials. Berlin’s top espionage agent, debonair Fanz Rintelen von Kleist was spending millions to finance sabotage in Canada, stir up trouble between the US and Mexico and to incite labor strikes. The British were engaged in propaganda too, though not illegal espionage. But they did not get caught; Germany took the blame as Americans grew ever more worried about the vulnerability of a free society to subversion. Indeed, one of the main fears Americans of all stations had in 1916-1919 was that spies and saboteurs were everywhere. This sentiment played a major role in arousing fear of Germany, and suspicions regarding everyone of German descent who could not “prove” 100% loyalty.[102] Americans felt an increasing need for a military that could command respect; as one editor put it, “The best thing about a large army and a strong navy is that they make it so much easier to say just what we want to say in our diplomatic correspondence.” Berlin thus far had backed down and apologized when Washington was angry, thus boosting American self- confidence. America’s rights and America’s honor increasingly came into focus. The slogan “Peace” gave way to “Peace with Honor.” The Army remained unpopular, however. A recruiter in Indianapolis noted that, “The people here do not take the right attitude towards army life as a career, and if a man joins from here he often tries to go out on the quiet.” The Preparedness movement used its easy access to the mass media to demonstrate that the War Department had no plans, no equipment, little training, no reserves, a laughable National Guard, and a wholly inadequate organization for war. Motion pictures like “The Birth of a Nation” (1915) and “The Battle Cry of Peace” (1915) depicted invasions of the American homeland that demanded action.[103]

Decision for war

The story of American entry into the war is a study in how public opinion changed radically in three years’ time. In 1914 Americans thought the war was a dreadful mistake and were determined to stay out.[citation needed] By 1917 the same public felt just as strongly that going to war was both necessary and wise.[citation needed] Military leaders had little to say during this debate, and military considerations were seldom raised.[citation needed] The decisive questions dealt with morality and visions of the future. The prevailing attitude was that America possessed a superior moral position as the only great nation devoted to the principles of freedom and democracy. By staying aloof from the squabbles of reactionary empires, it could preserve those ideals—sooner or later the rest of the world would come to appreciate and adopt them. In 1917 this very long-run program faced the severe danger that in the short run powerful forces adverse to democracy and freedom would triumph. Strong support for moralism came from religious leaders, women (led by Jane Addams), and from public figures like long-time Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan, the Secretary of State from 1913 to 1916. The most important moralist of all was President Woodrow Wilson—the man who dominated decision making so totally that the war has been correctly labelled “Wilson’s War.”[citation needed]

In 1917 Wilson, a Democrat, proved his political genius by winning the support of most of the moralists by proclaiming “a war to make the world safe for democracy.” If they truly believed in their ideals, he explained, now was the time to fight. The question then became whether Americans would fight for what they deeply believed in, and the answer turned out to be a resounding “YES”.[104]

In early 1917 Berlin forced the issue. The decision to try to sink every ship on the high seas was the immediate cause of American entry into the war. Five American merchant ships went down in March. If further evidence were needed, the German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, approached Mexico for an alliance; Mexico would join Germany in a war and be rewarded with the return of lost territories in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Outraged public opinion now overwhelmingly supported Wilson when he asked Congress for a declaration of war on April 2, 1917. The United States had a moral responsibility to enter the war, he proclaimed, to make the world safe for democracy. The future of the world was being determined on the battlefield, and American national interest demanded a voice. Wilson’s definition of the situation won wide acclaim, and, indeed, has shaped America’s role in world and military affairs ever since. Wilson saw that if Germany would win, the consequences would be bad for the United States. Germany would dominate Europe, which in turn controlled much of the world through colonies. The solution was “peace without victory” Wilson said. He meant a peace shaped by the United States along the lines of what in 1918 became Wilson’s Fourteen Points.[105]

Wartime diplomacy

The United States was an affiliated partner—an “ally” in practice but not in name. The U.S. has no treaty with the Allies, but did have high level contacts. Wilson assigned Colonel House the central role in working with British officials. As soon as the US declared war Britain sent the high-level Balfour Mission, April–May, 1917. France sent a separate mission at the same time. Both missions were eager was to publicize the Allied cause and work on plans for wartime cooperation. Balfour met with Wilson and Colonel House to review the secret treaties which bound Britain and France to Italy and others. Members of the delegations met with many senior leaders in the national government, finance, industry and politics, to explain the British positions. Other meetings dealt with the supply of munitions and other exports, and the proposed Balfour Declaration. Britain asked for naval help against the submarine menace, but realizing the small size of the American army, did not ask for soldiers.[106]

File:Timeline of WWI Eastern Front.jpg

Central Powers

Germany

Eastern Front

While the Western Front was static, the fighting on the Eastern Front moved back and forth over hundreds of miles. There were decisive wins and defeats, led off by the military collapse of Russia after the failure of the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, and the political collapse in 1917. There were decisive victories against the Russian army, starting in 1914 the trapping and defeat of large parts of the Russian contingent at the Battle of Tannenberg, followed by huge Austrian and German successes. The breakdown of Russian forces – exacerbated by internal turmoil caused by the 1917 Russian Revolution – led to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Bolsheviks were forced to sign on 3 March 1918 as Russia withdrew from the war. It gave Germany control of Eastern Europe.

Russia surrenders: the Treaty of Brest Litovsk

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918 between the new Bolshevik government of Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. Historian Spencer Tucker says, “The German General Staff had formulated extraordinarily harsh terms that shocked even the German negotiator.”[107]

Russia gave up all claims on Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Poland was not mentioned but it was taken over by Germany. A slice of territory was ceded to Turkey. Russia agreed to pay six billion German gold marks in reparations.

The treaty gave Germany multiple gains. Most important, it allowed the main forces in the East to the move to the Western front, where they outnumbered the Allies, since the Americans had not yet arrived in strength. Second and achieve the German war aims of controlling most of Eastern Europe. Third it supposedly solved the desperate German food shortages, since Ukraine was the bread basket of Russia. As for Russia, the new Bolshevik government desperately needed to end the war with Germany to concentrate on its multiple civil wars trying to overthrow the new regime from the right.

However Ukraine was so poorly organized that very little of the promised food was actually delivered to Germany. With Russia out of the war, the diplomatic constraints it imposes on the Allied war effort ended. That is, the promises made to Russia in 1914 were. The Treaty proved to the Allies that there could be no negotiated peace with Germany and that fighting would have to continue until it surrendered. The treaty became a nullity when Germany signed the Armistice in November 1918, which was effectively its surrender to the Allies.[108] When Germany later complained that the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 was too harsh on them, the Allies responded that it was more benign than Brest-Litovsk.[109]

Subversion of enemy states

At the start of the war, Germany expanded its unofficial propaganda machinery, establishing the Central Office for Foreign Services, which among other duties was tasked with propaganda distribution to neutral nations, persuading them to either side with Germany or to maintain their stance of neutrality. After the declaration of war, Britain immediately cut the undersea telegraph cables that connected Germany to the outside world, thereby cutting off a major propaganda outlet. The Germans relied instead on the powerful wireless Nauen Transmitter Station to broadcast pro-German news reports to the world. Among other techniques used to keep up the morale of the troops, mobile cinemas were regularly dispatched to the front line for the entertainment of the troops. Newsreels would portray current events with a pro-German slant. German propaganda techniques heavily relied on emphasising the mythological and martial nature of the Germanic ‘Volk‘ and the inevitability of its triumph.[110]

In December 1917 the German Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann explained the main goals of his diplomacy was now to subvert enemy states and make peace with breakaway states and thus undermine the political unity of the Entente:

The disruption of the Entente and the subsequent creation of political combinations agreeable to us constitute the most important war aim of our diplomacy. Russia appeared to be the weakest link in the enemy chain. The task therefore was gradually to loosen it, and, when possible, to remove it. This was the purpose of the subversive activity we caused to be carried out in Russia behind the front–in the first place promotion of separatist tendencies and support of the Bolsheviks. It was not until the Bolsheviks had received from us a steady flow of funds through various channels and under different labels that they were in a position to be able to build up their main organ, Pravda, to conduct energetic propaganda and appreciably to extend the originally narrow basis of their party. The Bolsheviks have now come to power; how long they will retain power cannot be yet foreseen. They need peace in order to strengthen their own position; on the other hand it is entirely in our interest that we should exploit the period while they are in power, which may be a short one, in order to attain firstly an armistice and then, if possible, peace.[111][112]

Historian Ron Carden says that Foreign Ministry’s propaganda in Spain used diplomats and subsidies to networks of businessmen and influential Spaniards. The goal was to convince Spain to remain neutral, which it did.[113]

Austro-Hungarian Empire

The Austro-Hungarian Empire played a relatively passive diplomatic role in the war, as it was increasingly dominated and controlled by Germany.[114][115] The only goal was to punish Serbia and try to stop the ethnic breakup of the Empire, and it completely failed. Instead as the war went on the ethnic unity declined; the Allies encouraged breakaway demands from minorities and the Empire faced disintegration. Starting in late 1916 the new Emperor Karl removed the pro-German officials and opened peace overtures to the Allies, whereby the entire war could be ended by compromise, or perhaps Austria would make a separate peace from Germany.[116] The main effort was vetoed by Italy, which had been promised large slices of Austria for joining the Allies in 1915. Austria was only willing to turn over the Trentino region but nothing more.[117] Karl was seen as a defeatist, which weakened his standing at home and with both the Allies and Germany.[118]

As the Imperial economy collapsed into severe hardship and even starvation, its multi-ethnic Army lost its morale and was increasingly hard pressed to hold its line. In the capital cities of Vienna and Budapest, the leftist and liberal movements and opposition parties strengthened and supported the separatism of ethnic minorities. As it became apparent that the Allies would win the war, nationalist movements, which had previously been calling for a greater degree of autonomy for their majority areas, started demanding full independence. The Emperor had lost much of his power to rule, as his realm disintegrated.[119]

By summer 1918, “Green Cadres” of army deserters formed armed bands in the hills of Croatia-Slavonia and civil authority disintegrated. By late October violence and massive looting erupted and there were efforts to form peasant republics. However The Croatian political leadership was focused on creating a new state (Yugoslavia) and worked with the advancing Serbian army to impose control and end the uprisings.[120]

Alexander Watson argues that, “The Habsburg regime’s doom was sealed when Wilson’s response to the note sent two and a half weeks earlier arrived on 20 October.” Wilson rejected the continuation of the dual monarchy as a negotiable possibility.[121] As one of his Fourteen Points, President Woodrow Wilson demanded that “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.”[122] In response, Emperor Karl I agreed to reconvene the Imperial Parliament in 1917 and allow the creation of a confederation with each national group exercising self-governance. However the leaders of these national groups rejected the idea; they deeply distrusted Vienna and were now determined to get independence.[123]

Poprava vůdců rumburské vzpoury 1918

The revolt of ethnic Czech units in Austria in May 1918 was brutally suppressed. It was punished as mutiny.

On 14 October 1918, Foreign Minister Baron István Burián von Rajecz asked for an armistice based on the Fourteen Points. In an appare nt attempt to demonstrate good faith, Emperor Karl issued a proclamation (“Imperial Manifesto of 16 October 1918”) two days later which would have significantly altered the structure of the Austrian half of the monarchy. The Polish majority regions of Galicia and Lodomeria were to be granted the option of seceding from the empire, and it was understood that they would join their ethnic brethren in Russia and Germany in resurrecting a Polish state. The rest of Cisleithania was to be transformed into a federal union composed of four parts—German, Czech, South Slav and Ukrainian. Each of these was to be governed by a national council that would negotiate the future of the empire with Vienna and Trieste was to receive a special status. No such proclamation could be issued in Hungary, where Hungarian aristocrats still believed they could subdue other nationalities and maintain their rule.

Karl’s proposal was a dead letter when on 18 October U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing replied that the Allies were now committed to the causes of the Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs. Therefore, Lansing said, autonomy for the nationalities was no longer enough. Karl’s last Hungarian prime minister, Mihály Károlyi, terminated the personal union with Austria on 31 October, officially dissolving the Austro-Hungarian state. By the end of October, there was nothing left of the Habsburg realm but its majority-German Danubian and Alpine provinces, and Karl’s authority was being challenged even there by the German-Austrian state council.[124][125]

Ottoman Empire (Turkey)

Ottoman Navy at the Golden Horn

A German postcard depicts the Ottoman Navy early in the war, The portrait shows Sultan Mehmed V.

The Ottoman Empire in 1914 had a population of about 25 million including 14 million Turks and large numbers of Arabs Armenians and Greeks and other minorities. It had lost almost all of its holdings in Europe and North Africa in a series of wars, most recently in 1912. The economy was heavily traditional, but with a strong German influence in terms of modernization, especially building railways. In 1914 the Ottoman government in Constantinople took the initiative in supporting the Central Powers. see Ottoman–German alliance Its Army already was under German guidance, especially by General Otto Liman von Sanders. The British expected the alliance with Germany and seized seized two dreadnoughts under construction that had been paid for by the Ottomans. Negotiations with the Allies went nowhere after the Turks demanded very large concessions. Instead a secret alliance was made with Germany in early August, with promises of regaining territory lost to Russia, Greece and Serbia in earlier wars. in the Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau two German battle cruisers fled to Constantinople for safety at the start of the war. Despite their German crews, they were officially enrolled in the Turkish Navy and followed the Sultan’s orders. They attacked Russian ports on the Black Sea in October; that led in a few days to mutual declarations of war.

German General Erich Ludendorff stated in his memoirs that he believed the entry of the Turks into the war allowed the outnumbered Central powers to fight on for two years longer than they would have been able on their own, a view shared by historian Ian F.W. Beckett.[126]

The Turks fought the war on multiple fronts: against Russia on the Black Sea and eastern Turkey and the Russian Caucasus; against Britain in Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Sinai and Palestine in 1917; and against the combined Allies at Gallipoli, near the approaches to Constantinople. Their great victory was at Gallipoli. Troop movements were extremely difficult because of the heavy inadequate and uncompleted railway system.

The Arab Revolt which began in 1916 turned the tide against the Ottomans on the Middle Eastern front, where they initially seemed to have the upper hand during the first two years of the war. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918, and set the partition of the Ottoman Empire under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. This treaty, as designed in the conference of London, allowed the Sultan to retain his position and title. The occupation of Constantinople and İzmir led to the establishment of a Turkish national movement, which won the Turkish War of Independence (1919–22) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later given the surname “Atatürk”). The sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922, and the last sultan, Mehmed VI (reigned 1918–22), left the country on 17 November 1922. The caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924.[127]

Morgenthau336

The Armenian Genocide was the Ottoman government’s systematic extermination of its Armenian subjects. The number of dead reached perhaps 1.5 million.

Armenian Genocide

The Armenian Genocide was the deliberate decision of Ottoman officials to remove Armenians from Easter Turkey, in a way that killed upwards of a million or more fleeing civilians.[128][129] In 1915, as the Russian Caucasus Army continued to advance into its eastern provinces the Ottoman government started the deportation of its ethnic Armenian population. The genocide was implemented in two phases: the wholesale killing of the able-bodied male population through massacre and subjection of army conscripts to forced labour, followed by the deportation of women, children, the elderly, and the infirm on death marches to the Syrian desert. Driven forward by military escorts, the deportees were deprived of food and water and subjected to periodic robbery, rape, and massacre.[130] The diplomatic dimension considered here was the diplomatic response of Allied powers. Ottoman officials denied any massacre, and their German allies helped cover for them. Allied governments tried diplomacy to stop the genocide but were ignored.[131]

On 24 May 1915 the Allies issued a joint public denunciation of the “mass murders” of the Armenians, denouncing a new “crime against humanity and civilization,” for which all guilty parties would be held personally responsible after the war. The victors brought the matter to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It did not follow-up.[132] The new Ottoman government did put some high officials on trial, punishing some—and executed a few. They condemned to death in absentia the top leaders, but these men had fled and were in hiding. However, Armenians did track down the interior minister Talaat Pasha and assassinated him in 1921 in Berlin. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 gave amnesty to the rest of the perpetrators.[133] The United States never declared war on Turkey, and did not join the condemnation of crimes against humanity, despite the urgent pleadings of the American ambassador to Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau Sr..[134]

Bulgaria

File:Bulgarien mit uns.jpg

In the aftermath of its defeat and territorial losses in the Balkan Wars Bulgaria felt betrayed and turned against its former ally Russia. Bulgaria in 1914-15 was neutral. In 1915 Germany and Austria realized they needed Bulgaria’s help in order to defeat Serbia militarily thereby opening supply lines from Germany to Turkey and bolstering the Eastern Front against Russia. In return for war, Bulgaria insisted on major territorial gains, especially Macedonia, which Austria was reluctant to grant until Berlin insisted. Bulgaria also negotiated with the Allies, who offered less generous terms. In 1915 the government of liberal prime minister Vasil Radoslavov therefore aligned Bulgaria with the Central Powers even though this meant becoming an ally of the Ottomans, Bulgaria’s traditional political and religious enemy. While Bulgaria now had no land claims against the Ottomans, it resented Serbia, Greece and Romania (allies of Britain and France) for seizing lands the Bulgarians decided belonged to them. Bulgaria signed an alliance with Germany and Austria in September 1915 that envisioned that Bulgaria would dominate the Balkans after victory in the war.[135][136]

Although the Bulgarian army was militarily successful in 1915-1917, its effectiveness collapsed in the summer of 1918. Morale was bad because of shortages of food at home, the munitions at the front. Both at the leadership in the popular level, there was a growing distrust of Germany intentions. War weariness was prevalent, and soldiers felt betrayed. Many resented having to fight their fellow Orthodox Christians in alliance with the Muslim Ottomans. The leadership lost the support of the Bulgarian people. The Russian Revolution of February 1917 crystallized the resentments in Bulgaria, spreading anti-war and anti-monarchist sentiment. In June Radoslavov’s government resigned. In September, 1918, the Allies invaded with 29 divisions and 700,000 troops. Bulgaria was quickly overrun and agreed to an armistice. Tsar Ferdinand abdicated, mutinies ravaged the army, and a republic was proclaimed. The Ottoman Empire now became disconnected from Germany and Austria and it too soon collapsed. On November 8, Bulgaria reentered the war on the Allied side. However it was too late: a year later he allies imposed very harsh Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine that stripped away more territory. Germany had loaned Bulgaria the money to fund the war; that debt was cancelled at Paris but the Allies imposed a £100 million reparations debt that the impoverished nation could not pay.[137]

New nations

Baltic states regions map

Baltic region with railroads and main roads

Three Baltic states

The Baltic region from Lithuania in the south, Latvia in the center and Estonia in the north were parts of the Russian Empire. A sense of nationalism emerged after the revolution of 1905 and February 1917 in Russia. By October 1917, the demand had moved from autonomy to independence. In 1915-17, Germany invaded from South to North and imposed military rule. Great armies marched back and forth—Riga, Latvia went through seven regime changes. Across the three states there were attacks on civilians, deportations, scorched earth campaigns, and concentration camps. Hundreds of thousands of people fled as refugees in Russia as far away as Vladivostok in eastern Siberia.[138] Local nationalists and Bolsheviks tried repeatedly to take control in the chaos. Bolsheviks controlled Latvia as the Iskolat regime and as the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1917 until they were driven out in May 1919. Bolsheviks also controlled Estonia until forced out by the Germans in early 1918. The Red Army of Soviet Russia invaded all three states in December 1918 to January 1919. However they were driven out by August 1919 by local forces aided by Finland. Peace treaties between the Soviets and the three Baltic states were finalized in 1920, and they remained independent until 1940.[139][140]

A portion of southern Lithuania around Vilnius became the Republic of Central Lithuania in 1920-1922. It was a puppet state controlled by Poland, and was absorbed into Poland in 1922. Poland’s seizure of Vilnius made normal relations with Lithuania impossible.[141]

Czechoslovakia

A Czechoslovak provisional government had joined the Allies on 14 October 1917. The South Slavs in both halves of the monarchy had already declared in favor of uniting with Serbia in a large South Slav state by way of the 1917 Corfu Declaration signed by members of the Yugoslav Committee, and the Croatians had begun disregarding orders from Budapest earlier in October.[142]

The American rejection of Emperor Karl’s last minute proposal for a federal union was the death certificate of Austria-Hungary.[143] The national councils had already begun acting more or less as provisional governments of independent countries. With defeat in the war imminent, Czech politicians peacefully took over command in Prague on 28 October (later celebrated as the birthday of Czechoslovakia) and followed up in other major cities in the next few days. On 30 October, the Slovaks followed in Martin. On the 29th of October, the Slavs in both portions of what remained of Austria-Hungary proclaimed the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. They also declared their ultimate intention was to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in a large South Slav state that in 1929 was renamed Yugoslavia.. On the same day, the Czechs and Slovaks formally proclaimed the establishment of Czechoslovakia as an independent state.

See also

Notes

  1. David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (1988).
  2. Z.A.B. Zeman, Diplomatic History of the First World War (1971)
  3. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals: December 1916 to November 1918, edited by James Brown Scott. (1921) 515pp online free
  4. W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, eds. Readings in European International Relations since 1870 (1931) pp 418-19
  5. Edward Hallett Carr (1953). The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 vol 3. pp. 10–13. https://books.google.com/books?id=1laU3T9HWYsC&pg=PA12.
  6. William Safire (2008). Safire’s Political Dictionary. Oxford UP. pp. 502–3. https://books.google.com/books?id=c4UoX6-Sv1AC&pg=PA502.
  7. Hew Strachan, The First World War: Volume I To Arms (2001) p. 1115.
  8. Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974 (1974) pp 281-84.
  9. J.A.S. Grenville, ed., The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts, Vol. 1 (Taylor & Francis, 2001) p. 61.
  10. Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy: Since 1914 (2002) pp 12-20.
  11. Grenville, pp. 62-63.
  12. Grenville, p. 63.
  13. Grenville, pp. 63-66.
  14. Robert B. Asprey, Hindenburg & Ludendorff: The German High Command at War (1991).
  15. Cathal Nolan (2017). The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost. Oxford UP. p. 382. https://books.google.com/books?id=2GjODQAAQBAJ&pg=PT382.
  16. Victor Rothwell, British war aims and peace diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford UP, 1971).
  17. D. Newton, “The Lansdowne ‘Peace Letter’ of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by Negotiation with Germany” Australian Journal of Politics & History (2002) 48#1 pp 16-39.
  18. C.J. Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention 1914-1915.” Historical Journal (1969) 12#3 533-548.
  19. Gordon Martel, ed. (2008). A Companion to International History 1900 – 2001. p. 132. https://books.google.com/books?id=ASLAUrX3UE8C&pg=PA132.
  20. Charles E. Neu (2014). Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner. p. iii. https://books.google.com/books?id=veeNBQAAQBAJ&pg=PR3-IA57.
  21. Richard D. Heffner and Alexander Heffner, eds. (2013). A Documentary History of the United States: Ninth Edition. Penguin. p. 153. https://books.google.com/books?id=GEun0OdclpQC&pg=PT153.
  22. David Welch, Germany, propaganda and total war, 1914-1918 (2000).
  23. John Milton Cooper, Jr. (2009). Woodrow Wilson. p. 381. https://books.google.com/books?id=lxoOdaCDbpEC&pg=PA381.
  24. Marquis, “Propaganda,” p 482; Stevenson, “First World War pp 93, 100.
  25. Strachan, The First World War: Volume I To Arms (2001) pp 974-75
  26. Peter Yearwood, “‘On the Safe and Right Lines’: The Lloyd George Government and the Origins of the League of Nations, 1916–1918.” Historical Journal 32#1 (1989): 131-155.
  27. Harvey Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts: An Analysis of War and Post-War Public Finance, 1914-1923 (1924) p 1, 21-37. The book is online at Questia
  28. Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts pp 21-37.
  29. Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (2005) pp 132-53
  30. Christopher Godden, “The Business of War: Reflections on Recent Contributions to the Economic and Business Histories of the First World War.” Œconomia. History, Methodology, Philosophy 6#4 (2016): 549-556. online
  31. Roger Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, Arming the Western Front: War, Business and the State in Britain, 1900–1920 (Routledge, 2016), p 1.
  32. Martin Horn, Britain, France, and the financing of the First World War (2002) ch 1.
  33. Geoffrey Wolff (2003). Black Sun: The Brief Transit and Violent Eclipse of Harry Crosby. New York Review of Books. ISBN 1-59017-066-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=RpVaAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1.
  34. Jennifer Siegel, For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Service of Tsars and Commissars (Oxford UP, 2014).
  35. R.J.Q. Adams, “Delivering the Goods: Reappaising the Ministry of Munitions: 1915-1916.” Albion 7#3 (1975): 232-244.
  36. Robert Blake, The Decline of Power: 1915-1964 (1985), p.3
  37. Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-219922-5.
  38. Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds. (1995). The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History. Oxford UP. p. 592. https://books.google.com/books?id=0Bu5GnLZCw0C&pg=PA592.
  39. Sidney H. Zebel, Balfour: A political biography (1973) pp 237-48; “small notch” p. 248.
  40. R.J.Q. Adams, Balfour: The last grandee (2007) pp 330-35.
  41. Frank W. Brecher, “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” American Jewish Archives 39.1 (1987): 23-47.
  42. Richard Ned Lebow, Wilson and the Balfour Declaration.” Journal of Modern History 40.4 (1968): 501-523. in JSTOR
  43. P R. Kumaraswamy (2015). Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. p. 299. https://books.google.com/books?id=hPN1CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA299.
  44. Lawrence Davidson, “The past as prelude: Zionism and the betrayal of American democratic principles, 1917-48.” Journal of Palestine Studies 31.3 (2002): 21-35.
  45. Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation.” Journal of Israeli History 35.2 (2016): 117-152.
  46. Thomas A. Bailey, “The United States and the blacklist during the great war.” Journal of Modern History 6.1 (1934): 14-35. in JSTOR
  47. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917 (1954) pp 154-55.
  48. Cody Nester, “France and the Great War: Belligerent Warmonger or Failed Peacekeeper? A Literature Review.” History 12 (2015): 2+.
  49. John Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (1985) summary
  50. Gary Cox, “France” in Robin Higham and Dennis E. Showalter, eds. Researching World War I: A Handbook (2003) pp 51–78
  51. Philippe Bernard, Henri Dubief, and Anthony Forster. The decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938 (1988) pp 3-90.
  52. Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France’s bid for power in Europe, 1914-1940 (1995), pp 16-39
  53. James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (2012).
  54. Martin Horn, “External Finance in Anglo-French Relations in the First World War, 1914–1917.” The International History Review 17.1 (1995): 51-77.
  55. Fabien Cardoni, “The ‘science’ of French public finances in the First World War.” Accounting History Review 24.2-3 (2014): 119-138.
  56. George Noble, Policies and opinions at Paris, 1919: Wilsonian diplomacy, the Versailles Peace, and French public opinion (1968).
  57. Stevenson, “The First World War and International Politics (1988) pp 31-32.
  58. T. G. Otte (2014). July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914. pp. 123–24.
  59. Walter G. Moss, A History of Russia: volume I: to 1917 (1997) pp 499-504, quote on page 503
  60. Peter Gatrell, “Tsarist Russia at War: The View from Above, 1914–February 1917,” Journal of Modern History 87#4 (2015) 675-78
  61. Hubertus Jahn, “Kaiser, Cossacks, and Kolbasniks: Caricatures of the German in Russian Popular Culture,” Journal of Popular Culture (1998) 31#4 109-122.
  62. Josh Sanborn, “The mobilization of 1914 and the question of the Russian nation: A reexamination.” Slavic Review 59.2 (2000): 267-289. online
  63. Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918 (2014). pp 462-63.
  64. Stefan T. Possony (2017). Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary. pp. 260–61. https://books.google.com/books?id=1KO8DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT260.
  65. Richard Pipes (2011). The Russian Revolution. p. 411. https://books.google.com/books?id=XtE54LuhFzEC&pg=PA411.
  66. George Katkov, “German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917,” International Affairs 32#2 (April 1956), pp. 181–89
  67. Watson, Ring of Steel, pp 509-12.
  68. Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918 (1996) pp 208-50.
  69. Keith E. Neilson, “The Breakup of the Anglo-Russian Alliance: The Question of Supply in 1917” International History Review 3#1 &1981), pp. 62-75, quote on p 65
  70. Zeman, Diplomatic History pp 207 – 42.
  71. Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (2009)
  72. Edward Acton et al. eds. Critical companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921 (1997).
  73. Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, pp 301-32.
  74. E.H. Kossmann, The Low Countries, 1780-1940 (Oxford UP, 1978) pp 517-44.
  75. “German Request for Free Passage through Belgium, and the Belgian Response, 2–3 August 1914”. www.firstworldwar.com. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/belgium_germanrequest.htm. Retrieved 31 December 2012.
  76. Fox, Sir Frank (1914). The Agony of Belgium The Invasion of Belgium in WWI August-December 1914. Beaumont Fox 2nd edition 2014. p. 19. http://sirfrankfox.com/excerpt-from-the-agony-of-belgium/.
  77. Johan Den Hertog, “The Commission for Relief in Belgium and the Political Diplomatic History of the First World War,” Diplomacy and Statecraft (2010) 21#4 pp 593–613.
  78. Naraoka Sōchi, “Japan’s First World War-Era Diplomacy, 1914–15.” in Antony est and Oliviero Frattolillo, eds. Japan and the Great War (2015) pp35+
  79. Strachan, The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (2003) 455-94.
  80. Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Harvard U. Asia Center, 1999).
  81. Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1970)
  82. Stephen G. Craft, “Angling for an Invitation to Paris: China’s Entry into the First World War.” International History Review 16#1 (1994): 1-24.
  83. Guoqi Xu, “The Great War and China’s military expedition plan.” Journal of Military History 72#1 (2008): 105-140.
  84. Clarence B. Davis, “Limits of Effacement: Britain and the Problem of American Cooperation and Competition in China, 1915-1917.” Pacific Historical Review 48#1 (1979): 47-63. in JSTOR
  85. Zhitian Luo, “National humiliation and national assertion-The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands” Modern Asian Studies (1993) 27#2 pp 297–319.
  86. Military Casualties-World War-Estimated,” Statistics Branch, GS, War Department, 25 February 1924; cited in World War I: People, Politics, and Power, published by Britannica Educational Publishing (2010) Page 219
  87. Glenn E. Torrey, “Romania in the First World War: The Years of Engagement, 1916-1918”, International History Review 14#3 (1992): 462–79.
  88. Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford UP, (1994).
  89. Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917 (1967) pp 706-7.
  90. Keegan p 253
  91. George B. Leon, Greece and the First World War: from neutrality to intervention, 1917-1918 (East European Monographs, 1990).
  92. Arthur S. Link (1960). Wilson, Volume III: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915. p. 66. https://books.google.com/books?id=dRfWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA66.
  93. E. M. House, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 1 ̃1912-1915 edited by Charles Seymour, (1926) vol 1 p 299, dated August 30, 1914
  94. Keene, Jennifer D. “Americans Respond: Perspectives on the Global War, 1914-1917.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 40.2 (2014): 266-286. online
  95. “Wilson’s First Lusitania Note to Germany: 13 May 1915” online
  96. David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (1988) pp 67-78.
  97. May, The World War and American Isolation p 414
  98. Michael Mandelbaum (2004). The Ideas That Conquered The World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets In The Twenty-first Century. pp. 24–25. https://books.google.com/books?id=H_XjtBzY8icC&pg=PA25.
  99. William M. Leary, “Woodrow Wilson, Irish Americans, and the Election of 1916.” Journal of American History 54.1 (1967): 57-72. in JSTOR
  100. Edward Cuddy, “Pro-Germanism and American Catholicism, 1914-1917.” Catholic Historical Review 54.3 (1968): 427-454.
  101. Anne Gillespie Lewis (2004). Swedes in Minnesota. Minnesota Historical Society Press. p. 56. https://books.google.com/books?id=jxGph-ledGUC&pg=PA56.
  102. Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Volume III: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (1960) 3:556ff
  103. John Patrick Finnegan, Against the specter of a dragon: The campaign for American military preparedness, 1914-1917 (1974).
  104. Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security (2009).
  105. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917 (1954) pp. 262-82.
  106. Richard Lee Loper, The Balfour Mission: Anglo-American Diplomacy, April–May, 1917 (1967).
  107. Spencer C. Tucker (2005). World War One. ABC-CLIO. p. 225. https://books.google.com/books?id=2YqjfHLyyj8C&pg=PA225.
  108. Wolfram Dornik and Peter Lieb, “Misconceived realpolitik in a failing state: the political and economical fiasco of the Central Powers in the Ukraine, 1918.” First World War Studies 4.1 (2013): 111-124.
  109. Zara S. Steiner (2005). The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933. Oxford U.P.. p. 68. https://books.google.com/books?id=V00vGP4TobwC&pg=PA68.
  110. David Welch, Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: the sins of omission (Rutgers Up, 2000).
  111. Z. A. B. Zeman. Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (1958) p 193
  112. See complete document at George Katkov, “German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917,” International Affairs 32#1 (April 1956) Document No. I, Berlin, 3rd December 1917.online
  113. Ron Carden (2014). German Policy Toward Neutral Spain, 1914-1918. Taylor & Francis. pp. 7–10.
  114. A. F. Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18 (1923) pp 68-128.
  115. Z.A.B. Zeman, A diplomatic history of the First World War (1971) pp 121-61.
  116. Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (1988) pp 139-48.
  117. David Stevenson, “The failure of peace by negotiation in 1917.” Historical Journal 34#1 (1991): 65-86.
  118. Edward P. Keleher, “Emperor Karl and the Sixtus Affair: Politico-Nationalist Repercussions in the Reich German and Austro-German Camps, and the Disintegration of Habsburg Austria, 1916-1918.” East European Quarterly 26.2 (1992): 163+.
  119. Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918 (2014). pp 536–40.
  120. Ivo Banac, “‘Emperor Karl Has Become a Comitadji’: The Croatian Disturbances of Autumn 1918.” Slavonic and East European Review 70#2 (1992): 284-305.
  121. Watson, Ring of Steel pp 541–2
  122. Robert Gerwarth (2016). The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End. p. 180. https://books.google.com/books?id=PikKDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA180.
  123. Ivo Banac, “‘Emperor Karl Has Become a Comitadji’: The Croatian Disturbances of Autumn 1918.” Slavonic and East European Review 70#2 (1992): 284-305 in JSTOR.
  124. Watson, Ring of Steel pp 542–56
  125. Z.A.B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire: 1914-1918 (1961).
  126. Ian Beckett, “Turkey’s Momentous Moment” HistoryToday 63#6 (2013)
  127. Hakan Ozoglu (2011). From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic. ABC-CLIO. p. 8. https://books.google.com/books?id=Cw5V1c1ej_cC&pg=PA8.
  128. Jo Laycock, “Beyond National Narratives? Centenary Histories, the First World War and the Armenian Genocide Armenian Genocide.” Revolutionary Russia 28.2 (2015): 93-117.
  129. For studies from scholars of the Ottoman Empire, see David Gutman, “Ottoman Historiography and the End of the Genocide Taboo: Writing the Armenian Genocide into Late Ottoman History.” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 2:1 (2015) pp 167-183. online
  130. Taner Akcam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton UP, 2013) online
  131. Thomas Schmutz, “Reacting to Violence: The Diplomatic Context of the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide (1913–1917).” Australian Journal of Politics & History 62.4 (2016): 501-513.
  132. Raymond Kévorkian (2011). The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. I.B.Tauris. pp. 763, 770–73.. https://books.google.com/books?id=JY4RifQksFMC&pg=PA763.
  133. Errol Mendes (2010). Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of Last Resort. p. 4. https://books.google.com/books?id=BfniC0_F6YMC&pg=PA4.
  134. Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (2002), pp 1-12.
  135. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920 (1977) pp 289–90
  136. Richard C. Hall, “Bulgaria in the First World War,” Historian, (2011) 73#2 pp 300–315
  137. Richard C. Hall, “‘The Enemy is Behind Us’: The Morale Crisis in the Bulgarian Army during the Summer of 1918,” War in History 11#2 pp 209-219.
  138. Aldis Purs, “Working towards ‘an unforeseen miracle’ redux: Latvian refugees in Vladivostok, 1918–1920, and in Latvia, 1943–1944.” Contemporary European History 16#4 (2007): 479-494.
  139. Alan Palmer, The Baltic: A new history of the region and its people (New York: Overlook Press, 2006; published in London with the title Northern shores: a history of the Baltic Sea and its peoples (John Murray, 2006). ch 21-22, pp 252-92.
  140. Dovile O. Vilkauskaite, “From Empire to Independence: The Curious Case of the Baltic States 1917-1922.” (thesis, University of Connecticut, 2013). online
  141. Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (2003), p. 64;
  142. Brent Mueggenberg, The Czecho-Slovak Struggle for Independence, 1914–1920 (2014).
  143. Z.A.B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire: 1914-1918 (1961).

Further reading

Surveys

  • Albrecht-Carrié, René. (1958). A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna. – 736pp; basic survey; available in many libraries
  • Fisk, H.E. The Inter-Ally Debts: An Analysis of War and Post-War Public Finance, 1914-1923 (1924) online Questia
  • Godden, Christopher. “The Business of War: Reflections on Recent Contributions to the Economic and Business Histories of the First World War.” Œconomia. History, Methodology, Philosophy 6#4 (2016): 549-556. online
  • Herwig, Holger H., and Neil M. Heyman, eds. Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Greenwood, 1982); includes prime ministers and main diplomats.
  • Higham, Robin and Dennis E. Showalter, eds. Researching World War I: A Handbook (2003) online
  • Hollander, Neil. Elusive Dove: The Search for Peace During World War I (2014), popular history; excerpt
  • Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500-2000 (1987), stress on economic and military factors
  • Keylor, William R. (2001). The Twentieth-century World: An International History (4th ed.).
  • Klingaman, William K. 1919, The Year Our World Began (1987) world perspective based on primary sources by a scholar.
  • Laidler, Harry W. Socialism in thought and action (1920) covers wartime roles in many countries online.
  • Langer, William L. Encyclopedia of world history: ancient, medieval, and modern, chronologically arranged (1968).
  • Marks, Sally (2002). The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World 1914-1945. pp. 121–342.
  • Marquis, Alice Goldfarb. “Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War” Journal of Contemporary History 13#3 (1978), pp. 467–498. online
  • Martel, Gordon, ed. (2008). A companion to international history 1900-2001. – chapters 9-21 pp 118–282. essays by experts; excerpt
  • Martel, Gordon, ed. A Companion to Europe 1900-1945 (2010), ch 17-26 pp 259–422; essays by experts; excerpts
    • Matthew Stibbe. “The War from Above: Aims, Strategy, and Diplomacy” in Martel, Gordon, editor. . A Companion to Europe: 1900-1945 (2011) 228-242
  • Meiser, Jeffrey W. Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898–1941 (Georgetown UP, 2015).
  • Mowat, C. L. (1968). The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12: The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898-1945 (2nd ed.). https://archive.org/stream/iB_CMH/12#page/n3/mode/1up. – 25 chapters; 845pp
  • Rich, Norman. Great power diplomacy. Since 1914 (2003) pp 1–40.
  • Stevenson, David. The First World War and International Politics (1988), thorough scholarly coverage
  • Stevenson, David. “The Diplomats” Winter. Jay, ed. The Cambridge History of the First World War: Volume II: The State (2014) vol 2 ch 3, pp 66–90.
  • Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (Oxford UP, 2003), thorough scholarly coverage to 1916
  • Taylor, A.J.P. The struggle for mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (1954) pp 532–68
  • Tooze, Adam. The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931 (2014) emphasis on economics excerpt.
  • Tucker, Spencer, ed. The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia (1999); 783pp, comprehensive
  • Winter, Jay, ed. The Cambridge History of the First World War (2 vol. 2014) v 2 “Diplomats” pp 62–90
  • Zeman, Z.A.B. A Diplomatic History of the First World War (1971); also published as The gentleman negotiators: the diplomatic history of World War I

Great Britain

  • Cassar, George H. Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918 (2009) full text online at JSTOR; excerpts
  • Egerton, George W. Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919 (1978) online
  • French, David. British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986)
  • French, David. The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (1995) online
  • Grey, Edward. “Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (vol 2 1925).
  • Grigg, John. Lloyd George: War leader, 1916–1918 (2002),
  • Hayes, Paul. Modern British foreign policy: The 20th century 1880 – 1939 (1978), pp, 177-222
  • Hinsley, Francis H, ed. British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey (1977)
  • Horn, Martin. Britain, France, and the financing of the First World War (2002)
  • Johnson, Gaynor. Lord Robert Cecil: politician and internationalist (Routledge, 2016).
  • Larsen, Daniel. “War Pessimism in Britain and an American Peace in Early 1916.” International History Review 34.4 (2012): 795-817.
  • Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill. The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 2 1972) pp 169–423.
  • Lutz, Hermann and E.W. Dickes, Lord Grey and the World War (1928) https://www.questia.com/library/73987567/lord-grey-and-the-world-war in Questia]]
  • Rothwell, Victor. British war aims and peace diplomacy, 1914-1918. (Oxford UP, 1971).
  • Taylor, A. J. P. English History, 1914–1945 (1965) pp 1–125
  • Weigall, David. Britain and the World: 1815-1986: A dictionary of international relations (1986)

France

  • Bernard, Philippe, and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914–1938 (1988) pp 3–82.
  • Blumenthal, Henry. Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914–1945 (1986)
  • Brecher, F.W. “French policy toward the Levant 1914-18.” Middle Eastern Studies (1993) 29#4 background to the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
  • Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. Victory through Coalition: Britain & France during the First World War. 2006, 304p
  • Hanks, Robert K. “‘Generalissimo’ or ‘Skunk’? The Impact of Georges Clemenceau’s Leadership on the Western Alliance in 1918.” French History (2010) 24#2 pp 197-217.
  • J. Nere (2001). The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. Island Press. pp. 1–10. https://books.google.com/books?id=PIeyAs95X2oC&pg=PR9.
  • Schuman, Frederick. War And Diplomacy In The French Republic (1931) online
  • Stevenson, David. French War Aims Against Germany, 1914–1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). The best and most detailed book on French war aims
  • Stevenson, David. “French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918” Historical Journal 22#4 (1979) pp. 877–894 in JSTOR

Russia

  • Acton, Edward, et al. eds. Critical companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921 (1997).
  • Boterbloem, Kees. “Chto delat’?: World War I in Russian Historiography after Communism.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25.3 (2012): 393-408.
  • Gatrell, Peter. Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (2005).
  • Gatrell, Peter. “Tsarist Russia at War: The View from Above, 1914–February 1917” Journal of Modern History 87#4 (2015) pp 668–700 online
  • Gilbert, Martin. Atlas of Russian history (1993). pp 79–108.
  • Jelavich, Barbara. St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974 (1974). pp 280–332.
  • Lincoln, W. Bruce. Passage through Armageddon: the Russians in war and revolution, 1914-1918 (1986)
  • MacKenzie, David. Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917 (1994). pp 172–82.
  • Morris, L. P. “The Russians, the Allies and the War, February–July 1917,” Slavonic and East European Review 50#118 (1972), pp. 29–48 in JSTOR
  • Neilson, Keith E. “The Breakup of the Anglo-Russian Alliance: The Question of Supply in 1917.” International History Review 3.1 (1981): 62-75.
  • Neilson, Keith. Strategy & Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 (1984).
  • Sanborn, Joshua A. Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (2014). excerpt
  • Sanborn, Joshua A. Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 (2003)
  • Saul, Norman E. Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy (2014).
  • Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and coexistence: Soviet foreign policy, 1917-73 (1974), pp 31–125.
  • Ullman, Richard Henry. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921: Intervention and the War. Vol. 1 (1961).
  • Zeman, Z. A. A diplomatic history of the First World War (1971) pp 207–86.

United States

  • *Adas, Michael. “Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I” Diplomatic History (2014) 38#4: 700-712. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu032
  • Clements, Kendrick A. “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34:1 (2004). pp. 62+. online edition
  • Cooper, John Milton. Woodrow Wilson. A Biography (2009), major scholarly biography.
  • Doenecke, Justus D. “Neutrality Policy and the Decision for War.” in Ross Kennedy ed., A Companion to Woodrow Wilson (2013) pp. 243–69 Online; covers the historiography
  • Doenecke, Justus D. Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (2011) 433 pages; comprehensive history online
  • Esposito, David M. The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I. (1996) 159pp online edition
  • Floyd, M. Ryan. Abandoning American Neutrality: Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War, August 1914-December 1915. (2013)
  • Hannigan, Robert E. The Great War and American Foreign Policy, 1914-24 (2016) excerpt; online at Questia
  • Hodgson, Godfrey. Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (2006).
  • Kazin, Michael. War Against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914-1918 (2017).
  • Keene, Jennifer D. “Remembering the “Forgotten War”: American Historiography on World War I.” Historian 78#3 (2016): 439–468.
  • Keene, Jennifer D. “Americans Respond: Perspectives on the Global War, 1914-1917.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 40.2 (2014): 266-286. online
  • Kennedy, Ross A. The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security (2009).
  • Link, Arthur S. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917. (1954).
  • May, Ernest R. The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917 (1959) online at ACLS e-books, highly influential study
  • Tucker, Robert W. Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917. (2007).

Central Powers

  • Asprey, Robert B. The German high command at war: Hindenburg and Ludendorff conduct World War I (1991).
  • Craig, Gordon A. “The World War I alliance of the Central Powers in retrospect: the military cohesion of the alliance.” Journal of Modern History 37.3 (1965): 336-344. in JSTOR
  • Kann, Robert A. et al., eds. The Habsburg Empire in World War I: Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political and Economic Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort (1977) online borrowing copy
  • Leidinger, Hannes. “Historiography 1918-Today (Austria-Hungary)” 1914-1918 Online (2014) online
  • Lutz, Ralph Haswell, ed. Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918 (2 vol 1932). 868pp online review, primary sources
  • Newman, John Paul, Samuel Foster, and Eric Beckett Weaver. “Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I.” Journal of Genocide Research 18.4 (2016): 503-513.
  • Pribram, A.F. Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18 (1923)
  • Stevenson, David. “The failure of peace by negotiation in 1917.” Historical Journal 34#1 (1991): 65-86.
  • Watson, Alexander. Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918 (2014).
  • Wawro, Geoffrey. A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire (2014).

Historiography

  • Gerwarth, Robert, and Erez Manela. “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923.” Diplomatic History 38.4 (2014): 786-800.
  • Keene, Jennifer D. “Remembering the “Forgotten War”: American Historiography on World War I.” Historian 78.3 (2016): 439-468.
  • Leidinger, Hannes. “Historiography 1918-Today (Austria-Hungary)” 1914-1918 Online (2014) online
  • Shinohara, Hatsue. “International Law and World War I.” Diplomatic History 38.4 (2014): 880-893.
  • Winter, Jay. “Historiography 1918-Today” 1914-1918 Online (2014) online
  • Winter, Jay and Antoine Prost. The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (Cambridge UP, 2005).
  • Winter, Jay, ed. The Legacy of the Great War: Ninety Years On (U of Missouri Press, 2009).

Primary sources and year books

  • Adamthwaite, Anthony P. ed. The Lost Peace, International Relations in Europe, 1918-1939 (1981) 236pp; excerpts from 69 documents.
  • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Official communications and speeches relating to peace proposals 1916-1917″ (1917) online free
  • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals: December 1916 to November 1918, edited by James Brown Scott. (1921) 515pp online free
  • Collins, Ross F. World War I: Primary Documents on Events from 1914 to 1919 (2007) excerpt and text search
  • Gooch, G. P. and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Volume XI, the Outbreak of War Foreign Office Documents (1926) online
  • Gooch, G. P. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (1940); 475pp detailed summaries of memoirs from all the major belligerents
    • Gooch, G. P. “Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs 2.1 (1923): 1-29. in JSTOR
  • Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill, eds. The Mirage of Power: The Documents of British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 3, 1972), pp 423-759
  • Mombauer, Annika. The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (2013), 592pp;
  • Scott, James Brown, ed. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921) Online at Questia
  • Zeman, Z. A. B. ed. Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (1958) in Questia
  • Annual Register 1915. world coverage; strongest on UKand British Empire
  • Annual Register 1916
  • Annual Register 1917
  • Annual Register 1918
  • Annual Register 1919
  • New International Year Book 1914, Comprehensive coverage of world and national affairs, 913pp
  • New International Year Book 1915, 791pp
  • New International Year Book 1916 (1917), 938pp
  • New International Year Book 1917 (1918), 904 pp
  • New International Year Book 1918 (1919), 904 pp
  • New InternationalYear Book 1919 (1920), 744pp

External links

src: https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_history_of_World_War_I